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Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation:
The Policymaking Role of Tort Law
TIMOTHY D. LYTrON
By all accounts, the prevalence of clergy sexual abuse and its cover-up
by Church officials represents a massive institutional failure. Obscured by
all of this attention to the Church's failure is the largely untold story of the
tort system's remarkable success in bringing the scandal to light in the first
place, focusing attention on the need for institutional reform, and spurring
Church leaders and public officials into action. Tort litigation framed the
problem of clergy sexual abuse as one of institutional failure, and it placed
that problem on the policy agendas of the Catholic Church, law
enforcement, and state governments. This Article examines these framing
and agenda-setting effects of clergy sexual abuse litigation. It argues that
private lawsuits can have a powerful and beneficial effect on
policymaking.
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Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation:
The Policymaking Role of Tort Law
TIMOTHY D. LYTTON'
"The real story should be told from legal documents."
-Arthur Jones, Washington Bureau
Chief of the National Catholic Reporter'
"It would be silly not to concede that the gravity of the
litigation wasn't a motivating factor in ... keeping the
church's attention focused on ... the problems with the
children."
-J. Michael Hennigan, attorney for the
L.A. archdiocese
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The sexual abuse of children by Catholic clergy has been called "the
greatest scandal in the history of religion in America and perhaps the most
serious crisis Catholicism has faced since the Reformation."3  By all
accounts, the prevalence of clergy sexual abuse and its cover-up by Church
officials represents a massive institutional failure. Obscured by all of this
attention to the Church's failure is the largely untold story of the tort
system's remarkable success in bringing the scandal to light, focusing
attention on the need for institutional reform, and spurring Church leaders
and public officials into action. Tort litigation framed the problem of
clergy sexual abuse as one of institutional failure, and it placed that
problem on the policy agendas of the Catholic Church, law enforcement,
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991, Yale University. I am grateful
for comments on earlier drafts by Mitchell Abolafia, Tom Baker, Jen Balboni, Frank Baumgartner,
Jason Berry, Stephen Daniels, Tom Doyle, Don Gifford, Leslie Griffin, Greg Mandel, Lynn Mather,
Richard Nagareda, Larry Rosenthal, Peter Schuck, Tony Sebok, Steve Sugarman, Margaret Tullai,
Wendy Wagner, and Steve Wasby. I also benefited from faculty workshops at NYU and the University
of Michigan law schools. Essential research assistance was provided by Bob Begg, Theresa Colbert,
Kelly Egan, Bob Emery, Ryan Keleher, Kelcie McLaughlin, Theresa Monroe, Luke Nikas, Josh Olsen,
Rayleen Schmidt, J. Quentin Simon, Mark Skanes, Mary Wood, and Seth Zoracki. I received generous
financial support for this Article from an Albany Law School Summer Research Grant. This Article is
part of a book-length study entitled HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: How LAWSUITS HELPED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (forthcoming 2007). Please send comments
to tlytt@albanylaw.edu.
1 JASON BERRY, LEAD Us NOT INTO TEMPTATION 73 (1992).
2 Telephone Interview with J. Michael Hermigan, Attorney for the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, in
Albany, NY (Mar. 29, 2006) (transcript on file with Connecticut Law Review).
3 Richard N. Ostling, Sex Abuse Crisis Not New for Church, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 8, 2002,
available at LexisNexis Academic, News Wires (quoting Rev. Andrew Greeley).
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and state governments. This Article examines these framing and agenda-
setting effects of clergy sexual abuse litigation. It argues that private
lawsuits can have a powerful and beneficial effect on policymaking.
The standard account of tort law sees its primary public policy impact
in terms of deterring and spreading risk and- articulating public norms of
justice.4 It emphasizes the policy implications of liability judgments and
tort doctrines. It focuses on litigation outcomes. By contrast, in recent
years, tort scholars have begun to pay more attention to the policy impact
of the litigation process. For example, in case studies of tobacco and gun
litigation, scholars have shown how pleading, discovery, and trial uncover
hidden information, shape public perceptions, and complement legislative
and agency regulation.5 This examination of clergy sexual abuse litigation
builds on these findings.
Clergy sexual abuse litigation provides an especially powerful example
of tort litigation's impact on policymaking. Prior to the filing of lawsuits
in the 1980s, local media reporting of sexual abuse by clergy was scant and
infrequent and there was no national media coverage of the issue.
Prosecutions were rare and public discussion and policy debate non-
existent. Litigation was the primary force in attracting attention to the
problem, shaping perceptions of it, and making it a policy priority within
both the Church and state governments. Compared to tobacco and gun
litigation, clergy sexual abuse litigation offers a more attractive example of
tort litigation's impact on policymaking. Whereas tobacco and gun
litigation have produced, at best, only modest advances in tobacco and gun
control, clergy sexual abuse litigation has made it possible for child sexual
abuse victims to hold one of the largest, richest, and most powerful
institutions in America publicly accountable and has forced reluctant
Church and government officials to adopt sensible policies to address a
widespread social problem.
The successes of clergy sexual abuse litigation have not been without
cost. Fear of litigation has led some Church officials to conceal
information that they might otherwise have disclosed.6 Heightened
suspicion of priests has impaired their ability to perform many pastoral
4 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-17 (1997);
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 13-21 (2000).
5 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Tons: Litigation as a Legislative
Strategy-Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 493, 498
(2001); Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The
Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 769 (1999); Timothy D. Lytton, The
Complementary Role of Ton Litigation in Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY:
A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 250 (Timothy D. Lytton ed.,
2005); Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897 (1998); Richard A. Nagareda, Gun Litigation in the Mass Tort Context,
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra, at 176; Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the
Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra, at 271.
6 PHILIP JENKINS, PEDOPHILES AND PRIESTS: ANATOMY OF A CONTEMPORARY CRISIS 38 (1996).
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duties, and mistrust of the hierarchy has damaged the credibility of the
Church as a whole.7 Judgments, settlements, and litigation costs have
forced some dioceses to scale back their educational, healthcare, and anti-
poverty programs, and, in some cases, to file for bankruptcy.' A
comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of clergy sexual abuse
is beyond the scope of this Article. Any firm conclusion about the
litigation's value requires careful attention to empirical data about the costs
of the litigation and to the concrete results of the policies aimed at
addressing them.9
My aim in this Article is more modest. Without attempting to argue
that the benefits of clergy sexual abuse litigation outweigh its costs, I claim
merely that framing the problem as one of institutional failure and placing
institutional reform on the policy agendas of Church and government
officials are two clear benefits of the litigation. In addition, I claim that
these benefits are ignored by tort reform advocates who denounce litigation
as inefficient and skeptics who suggest that litigation is ineffective as a
means of achieving social change.'l A case study of clergy sexual abuse
litigation does not establish that framing and agenda-setting effects are
always beneficial, but it does provide one clear example where they are.
At the very least, these impacts on policymaking-which in some contexts
are highly beneficial-should be taken into account in any fair assessment
of the tort system. Thus, clergy sexual abuse litigation gives us reason to
revisit the case for tort reform and to reconsider skepticism regarding the
usefulness of litigation in addressing social problems.
My claim that clergy sexual abuse litigation has had significant and
beneficial effects on policymaking relies on two arguments. First, I argue
that tort litigation led the news media to report clergy sexual abuse and to
frame it as an issue of institutional failure. Second, I argue that litigation
7 See STEPHEN J. ROSSETTI, A TRAGIC GRACE: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE 24-44 (1996).
8 JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIM. JUST., THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1950-2002, at 103-20 (2004); Wendy N.
Davis, Church and Chapter 11: Dioceses Faced with Sex-Abuse Scandal Now Confront Issues in
Bankruptcy Court, ABA J., Oct. 2005, at 14, 14.
9 For an assessment of the costs and benefits of clergy sexual abuse litigation, see TIMOTHY
LYTTON, CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE LITIGATION: THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE LAW SUITS ON
POLICYMAKING (forthcoming 2007).
10 Works by leading tort reform advocates include the following: CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE
AGAINST LAWYERS: How LAWYERS, POLITICIANS, AND BUREAUCRATS HAVE TURNED THE LAW INTO
AN INSTRUMENT OF TYRANNY-AND WHAT WE AS CITIZENS HAVE TO DO ABOUT IT (2002); PHILIP K.
HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES
OUR FREEDOM (2001); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION
ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW (2003). Perhaps the most influential argument by a
skeptic in recent years is GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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and the public concern it generated placed clergy sexual abuse on the
policy agendas of the Catholic Church, law enforcement, and state
legislatures, and shaped policy responses to the problem. Parts II and III of
this Article present these arguments, supported by theoretical models,
interviews with attorneys and journalists, content analysis of news stories,
surveys, and statistical data.
Part IV presents two implications of my analysis. First, tort litigation
can have beneficial effects on policymaking. Clergy sexual abuse presents
a stark counter-example to tort reform advocates who assert that tort
litigation does more policy harm than good. Second, tort litigation can be
an effective way to promote policy reform. Clergy sexual abuse litigation
should give pause to litigation skeptics who suggest that "U.S. courts can
almost never be effective producers of significant social reform."'" I
conclude by suggesting that we can attain a more complete understanding
of the tort system if we view the litigation process as a policy venue-that
is, as an institutional setting in which policymaking occurs.
II. TORT LITIGATION & NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF
CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE
In lawsuits against the Catholic Church, plaintiffs have framed clergy
sexual abuse as not merely a problem of child exploitation by individual
clergy members, but also as an issue of institutional failure on the part of
Church officials. This frame of institutional failure quickly became the
dominant frame in news media coverage of the issue.
In this section, I explain why plaintiffs' framing of clergy sexual abuse
as an institutional failure by Church officials became the dominant news
frame. My analysis reveals a correlation between certain features of
litigation and news production that account for the influence of clergy
sexual abuse lawsuits on press coverage. Complaints provided dramatic
narratives with clear moral implications that made for gripping news
stories. Discovery documents, deposition transcripts, and trial testimony
were perceived by journalists as especially reliable sources of information.
The litigation process provided a steady flow of new developments that
supported ongoing coverage. And intensive coverage encouraged
increasing numbers of victims to come forward and seek legal redress,
spurring additional litigation, which, in turn, gave rise to more coverage,
creating a self-reinforcing news theme and the perception of a "wave" of
litigation and a "crisis" in the Church.
I begin by introducing three leading clergy sexual abuse cases, upon
which I draw for examples throughout my analysis. I then briefly present
the concept of framing, which is central to both law and journalism and to
my account of the relationship between litigation and news production.
1 "ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 338 (emphasis omitted).
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Next, I analyze more closely the particular features of litigation and news
production that explain the plaintiffs' influence on media coverage of
clergy sexual abuse. I support theoretical claims about the correlation
between litigation and news production with empirical support from
interviews of lawyers and journalists, content analysis of news stories, and
statistical data. Finally, I explain why, in the case of clergy sexual abuse,
the plaintiffs' frame of institutional responsibility dominated news media
coverage of the issue despite efforts by the Church's defenders to frame the
issue differently.
A. Three Leading Cases: Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan
Clergy sexual abuse litigation is an enormously complex phenomenon.
It includes thousands of lawsuits across the country, spanning more than
twenty years from the mid-1980s to the present. A comprehensive survey
of the cases and legal issues involved in the litigation is beyond the scope
of this Article.12 My aim here is merely to introduce three cases that each
played a significant role within the history of clergy sexual abuse litigation
and that can be used to illustrate my claims about the influence of this
litigation on media coverage and the influence of that media coverage on
policymaking.
In the summer of 1983, it came to light that Father Gilbert Gauthe had
sexually abused dozens of children in a small parish near Lafayette,
Louisiana, where he served as the local priest. 3  One family-the
Gastals-refused the diocese's offer of a confidential settlement and, in
1984, filed suit against Gauthe and his superiors. 14 Alleging theories of
respondeat superior and negligent supervision, the Gastals won a $1.25
million verdict against the diocese.'5 The diocese appealed, and the parties
eventually settled for $1 million.' 6
Prior to the Gauthe case, incidents of clergy sexual abuse were viewed
as rare and isolated occurrences, and they attracted limited local press
coverage or, more often, no press coverage at all. The Gastals's civil suit
against Gauthe and the Diocese of Lafayette was the first case of clergy
sexual abuse to attract national attention and, in conjunction with
concurrent cases around the country, it created the impression of a
pervasive, nationwide problem. The Gauthe litigation inspired victims
12 For an overview of clergy sexual abuse litigation, see LYTTON, supra note 9, at chs. 1-3.
13 BERRY, supra note 1, at 14-15, 18, 25-26.
14 Id. at 23-26.
5 Petition for Damages 21-22, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175 (La. 15th Dist. June 27, 1984)
(on file with Connecticut Law Review); BERRY, supra note 1, at 163.
16 BERRY, supra note 1 at 168. For a detailed account of the case, see id. at 148-68; J. MINOS
SIMON, LAW IN THE CAJUN NATION 134-63 (1993).
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around the country to come forward and, in increasing numbers, to file
lawsuits.17 It also caught the attention of Bishops around the country, who
began for the first time as a group to discuss the problem and explore ways
to address it.'
8
In 1992, the Diocese of Fall River, Massachusetts settled claims of
sexual abuse by Father James Porter with sixty-eight victims for an
undisclosed sum, reported in the Boston Globe as "at least $5 million."' 9
This was, to date, the largest group settlement of sexual abuse claims
against the Church.20 But this was not the end of the story. The diocese
subsequently settled another thirty-three claims for undisclosed sums. 2'
The total number of Porter's victims is estimated at well over 100--some
put the total closer to 200-abused over a fourteen-year period from 1960-
1974, in five parish assignments in Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Mexico, and Texas.
22
The Porter case attracted widespread media attention, led to a dramatic
increase in the number of victims willing to come forward, and stimulated
further litigation against the Church. Parallels with the Gauthe case were
inescapable. The Porter affair fueled perceptions among victims and
plaintiffs' attorneys of an organized conspiracy among the Bishops to
protect child molesters and to conceal the widespread problem of clergy
sexual abuse within the Church.2 3 For their part, Church officials pledged
to formulate more effective policies to prevent child sexual abuse by clergy
and to respond more openly when it occurred.24
In 2002, litigation against the Boston archdiocese for sexual abuse
committed by Father John Geoghan became a symbol for the clergy sexual
abuse scandal. The archdiocese had quietly settled the claims of over fifty
of Geoghan's victims in the late 1990s for over $10 million and, in 2002, it
17 Evidence of increased litigation following the Gauthe case is anecdotal and based on the
following sources: Telephone Interview with Jeff Anderson, Senior Partner, Jeff Anderson &
Associates, P.A., in Albany, NY (Mar. 10, 2006) (transcript on file with Connecticut Law Review)
[hereinafter Anderson Interview]; Telephone Interview with David Clohessy, National Director,
Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP), in Albany, NY (Mar. 13, 2006) (transcript on
file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Clohessy Interview]; Telephone Interview with Steve
Rubino, Senior Partner, Ross & Rubino, L.L.P., in Albany, NY (Apr. 5, 2006) (transcript on file with
Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Rubino Interview].
8 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
19 Stephen Kurkjian, 68 Victims Settle Porter Case with Catholic Church, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
4, 1992, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
20 Id.
21 Survivor Connections, Frank L. Fitzpatrick vs ex-priest James R. Porter Brief Chronology,
through 1993, http://members.cox.net/survivorconnections/flfvsporter.htmi (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
2 These and other details of the case can be found in ELINOR BURKETT & FRANK BRUNI, A
GOSPEL OF SHAME: CHILDREN, SEXUAL ABUSE, AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 8-9, 14, 17-18, 20-21,
23-24 (1993).
23 Telephone Interview with Sylvia Demarest, Senior Partner, Demarest, Smith, Giunta & Howell,
P.L.L.C., in Albany, NY (Apr. 25, 2006) (transcript on file with Connecticut Law review) [hereinafter
Dernarest Interview].
24 See infra Part ll.A.2.a.
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entered into a highly-publicized settlement with an additional eighty-six
victims for another $10 million.25
What distinguished the Geoghan case from its predecessors was the
astounding scope of the abuse and the cover-up. In the end, 200 Geoghan
victims, molested over a thirty-three year period, filed claims, and experts
estimate that the total number of Geoghan's victims could be as high as
800.26 Diocesan personnel files show that Church officials were aware of
Geoghan's misconduct, failed to report it or notify parishioners, and
repeatedly reassigned him to positions where he would have access to
children.27 The cover up implicated no less than six Bishops and
ultimately forced Cardinal Bernard Law, the highly influential Archbishop
of Boston, to step down and seek refuge in Rome.28 The wave of litigation
initiated by the Geoghan affair turned out to be a tidal wave which swept
the country from Boston to Los Angeles.
I focus on these three cases--Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan-because
each attracted significant news media coverage which, in turn, led Church
and government officials to consider new policies aimed at addressing
clergy sexual abuse. As we shall see, the Gauthe case inspired the first
national media coverage of the issue, and the Porter and Geoghan cases
sparked dramatic increases in the volume of coverage. Each was also
followed by significant policy reforms. I do not, however, mean to suggest
that there were no important cases or policy efforts in the periods between
these three high profile cases. Other cases have uncovered new
information, tested novel legal theories, involved complex constitutional
concerns, resulted in dramatic verdicts, and raised perplexing insurance
coverage and bankruptcy issues. 29 The Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases
offer snapshots at particular times within this larger history of clergy
sexual abuse lawsuits that highlight the relationship between litigation,
press coverage, and policymaking.
B. Frame Analysis
At this point it will be helpful to introduce frame analysis, which is
central to my account of the relationship between litigation, news
25 Walter V. Robinson, Diocese, Plaintiffs Settle Suit: 86 Geoghan Cases to Cost up to $30M,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File; Walter V.
Robinson & Michael Rezendez, Geoghan Victims Agree to $1OM Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19,
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
26 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 6, 14-16, 19, 22-23, 27 (2002).
7Id. at x, 3, 8, 14,23,26.
28 Id. at viii, x, 3, 14, 22, 24, 205-06. For further details of the Geoghan case, see DAVID
FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL 129-48
(2004).
29 See LYTTON, supra note 9, at ch. 3.
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production, and policymaking. In order to understand and communicate
our experience of the world, we must select, organize, and contextualize
our perceptions. Thus, facts are always presented within some larger
conceptual frame. These frames allow us to make sense of the world by
focusing on aspects of our experience that we consider relevant, putting
them together into a coherent whole, and relating them to things we
already know in order to make experience meaningful. Of course,
individuals often frame the same event or issue differently, and many
disputes arise out of differences in framing.
Framing is the selection, organization, and presentation of issues,
events, or people that places them within a context with the aim of
promoting a particular interpretation or evaluation.30  Frames are the
principles of selection, organization, and presentation that guide framing.'
For example, whether Bernard Goetz's shooting of an unarmed assailant
constitutes a justified act of self-defense or a deplorable instance of gun
violence depends upon how one frames it.32  Indeed, any particular
characterization of the event-in this case, mentioning that the victim was
"unarmed" (or, in this last sentence, identifying him as a "victim")-itself
implies a choice of frame.
Frames can be combined in different ways. A frame can be reused
repeatedly to draw connections between different events in order to suggest
a pattern. A number of shootings can all be framed as similar instances of
gun violence in order to suggest a gun violence "problem" or, if there are
enough instances, a gun violence "epidemic." Different frames can be
used to emphasize distinctions between events. Instead of reusing the
same frame of gun violence to characterize all fatal shootings, one might
frame some as assaults, some as accidents, and some as suicides,
suggesting an array of quite dissimilar phenomena. A frame can itself be
placed within another frame in ways that affect how the initial frame is
viewed,33 as when gun control advocates frame assertions of a gun
violence epidemic as social science findings, or when gun rights advocates
frame the same assertions as a propaganda campaign aimed at promoting
gun control.
Frames often suggest a particular course of action.34 Thus, framing the
rate of highway fatalities as caused by unsafe driving suggests stricter
30 ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 5, 23 (2004); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 10-11 (1974).
31 TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING & UNMAKING
OF THE NEW LEFT 6 (1980).
32 Marcia Chambers, Choices in IRT Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1985, at B4, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
33 GOFFMAN, supra note 30, at 82.
3 ENTMAN, supra note 30, at 5; DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION:
TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 29 (1994).
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enforcement of traffic laws, whereas framing it as due to poor automobile
design suggests imposing more rigorous design standards on car
manufacturers. 35 Framing fatalities as a "problem" in the first place-as
opposed to merely a necessary cost of widely accessible highway travel-
itself suggests that some course of action is necessary.
As the above examples suggest, frames often compete. The ability of
one frame to predominate over others depends upon a number of factors.
First, the cultural resonance of a frame contributes to its persuasive
power.36 A frame has a high degree of cultural resonance when the
language and images that it employs reinforce widely-held views or evoke
shared values. Frames that resonate with popular political principles,
moral commitments, and world views will be more convincing. Second,
the prominence of a frame also enhances its persuasive power. Early
articulation of a frame soon after an event gives a frame prominence, as
does adoption of the frame by a respected person or institution.38 Third,
repetition of a frame enhances its persuasive power.39 Repetition creates a
perception of widespread acceptance and leads some people to adopt it out
of a desire to conform. This may even result in a reality of widespread
acceptance.4°
Information travels between people in frames. The persuasiveness of a
frame determines how readily facts in it are accepted and how widely they
are disseminated. The widespread diffusion of a frame has the quality of a
cascade, building momentum and developing cumulative force as it
flows. 4 1 Successful diffusion of culturally resonant frames reinforces the
cultural values that made them persuasive in the first place, which in turn
makes these frames even more persuasive over time. So too, as frames
become more widely accepted, they are more likely to be championed by
prominent figures and repeated more frequently. This leads other
prominent figures to promote them, increasing their prominence and the
frequency with which they are repeated. As the momentum of a frame
builds, individuals may accept it based on deference to the opinions of
experts and authorities, reliance on common sense and conventional
wisdom, and social pressure to conform.42 Successful frames thus tend to
become more pervasive and persuasive as they cascade.
35 See generally RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
36 ENTMAN, supra note 30, at 6; SCHON & REIN, supra note 34, at 27.
37 See ENTMAN, supra note 30, at 6-9, 14-17 (discussing "schemas"); SCHON & REIN, supra note
34, at 28 (discussing "metacultural frames").
38 See ENTMAN, supra note 30, at 6-7.
3 Id. at 6.
40 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 685-87 (1999) (discussing informational and reputational cascades).
41 See generally id.
42 Id. at 686-87.
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Frame analysis is helpful in understanding the relationship between
tort litigation, media coverage, and policymaking. Clergy sexual abuse
litigation illustrates how the litigation process is capable of generating
persuasive frames that are promulgated by the news media and ultimately
adopted by policy-makers. I turn next to a more detailed examination of
why the litigation process led plaintiffs' lawyers to frame clergy sexual
abuse as an issue of institutional failure and why the nature of the news
production led journalists to promulgate this frame.
C. The Influence of Litigation Frames on Media Frames
Tort litigation attracts media coverage because it has many of the
ingredients that make a story newsworthy: tort claims are framed in terms
of personal drama about injury and wrongdoing, legal documents are
readily available and viewed as highly credible sources of information, and
the litigation process provides a steady stream of episodic developments as
claims move forward. Tort litigation provides ready-made news frames.
In the case of clergy sexual abuse litigation, as we shall see, plaintiffs'
frames dominated media coverage because plaintiffs presented frames that
more closely matched the demands of the news production process.43
1. The Complaint's Compelling Narrative and Cultural Resonance
Both the litigation process and the news production process provide
incentives to frame issues in terms of dramatic narratives with clear moral
implications. Consider first the litigation process. Most tort causes of
action require that plaintiffs frame their claims in terms of injury caused by
wrongdoing. The need to convince judges and jurors of the claim's merit
leads plaintiffs to dramatize this basic narrative structure as a morality tale
about right and wrong. 4 The value of plaintiffs' claims are enhanced by
portraying injuries as severe and wrongdoing as egregious. One's chances
of recovery are increased by naming defendants capable of satisfying
judgments, who are often well-known figures or institutions. The familiar
story of an innocent victim injured by uncaring and unaccountable
corporate officers constitutes a persuasive frame.
For their part, defendants seek to reframe plaintiffs' allegations in
doctrinally significant and culturally familiar terms of consensual risk
taking, the plaintiff's own or some third party's carelessness, or just bad
43 For a discussion of the adoption of plaintiffs' frames by the media in tobacco litigation, see
Mather, supra note 4, at 914-16; cf WILLIAM HALTOM, REPORTING ON THE COURTS: HOW THE MASS
MEDIA COVER JUDICIAL ACTIONS 205, 238 (1998) (suggesting that civil cases are less newsworthy
than criminal cases and attract little coverage); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING
THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 20, 158, 243-45 (2004) (questioning the
newsworthiness of plaintiffs' claims, but noting tobacco claims as a rare exception).
4 See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 92
(2000) (explaining that jurors are attracted to conceptions of accidents that take the form of
melodramas).
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luck. In arguing before a jury, defense lawyers often counter plaintiffs'
frames of corporate malfeasance with their own narratives about
undeserving plaintiffs seeking to hold innocent business defendants liable
for normal misfortunes. These frames, which have gained widespread
cultural resonance thanks to public campaigns for tort reform, can be just
as persuasive as plaintiffs' frames.46
Like filing a claim, reporting news is an act of framing.47 Sources,
reporters, editors, publishers, and broadcasters frame events, issues, and
people in order to create news stories. One powerful influence on the
construction of news is audience demand. Newsmaking is a business that
depends upon advertising revenue, and advertising rates are determined by
circulation.48 News organizations are thus sensitive to what readers want.
Media scholars have identified criteria that journalists use in selecting and
framing news stories based on their perception of what readers want.
These criteria define what makes a story newsworthy.
The newsworthiness of a story depends largely on its form. First, a
story is more likely to be considered newsworthy if it can be framed as a
dramatic narrative that involves active characters and exciting events.49
Personal conflict provides a common premise for such dramatic narrative,
and groups and institutions are commonly personified in order to increase
dramatic effect. 50 A central event, or "peg," provides an attention-getting
image around which the narrative can be organized. 51  Second, the
magnitude of an event and the extent of its impact influence its
newsworthiness.52 All things being equal, the more powerful the storm and
the more widespread its destruction, the more newsworthy it is. The
magnitude and impact of an event can be increased by framing it as a part
of a larger trend or crisis, such as the worst hurricane season of the century.
Third, a narrative with clear implications and straightforward moral
lessons is considered more newsworthy than one open to many different
41 Id. at 97-98.
46 See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 43, at 33-72.
47 For analysis of news as a frame, see GITLIN, supra note 31, at 6-7, 49; GAYE TUCHMAN,
MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 1, 92 (1978).
48 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 117-33 (2003); Graham Murdock, Political
Deviance: The Press Presentation of a Militant Mass Demonstration, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS:
SOCIAL PROBLEMS, DEVIANCE AND THE MASS MEDIA 158 (Stanley Cohen & Jock Young eds., 1973).
49 HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS: A STUDY OF THE CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC
NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND TIME 171 (1979); GITLIN, supra note 31, at 28; HALTOM, supra note
43, at 185-86; SCHUDSON, supra note 48, at 48, 178; Murdock, supra note 48, at 165.
50 On personal conflict, see GANS, supra note 49, at 22; GITLIN, supra note 31, at 28; SCHUDSON,
supra note 48, at 48. On personification, see GANS, supra note 49, at 8, 19; GITLIN, supra note 31, at
28; Johan Galtung & Mari Ruge, Structuring and Selecting News, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS:
SOCIAL PROBLEMS, DEVIANCE AND THE MASS MEDIA 52, 57 (Stanley Cohen & Jock Young eds., rev.
ed. 1981).
51 GANS, supra note 49, at 168; GITLIN, supra note 31, at 35.
52 GANS, supra note 49, at 151; Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 54.
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interpretations.53 Fourth, the news media favor stories that are set in
frames that are culturally familiar to readers.54 The familiarity of the
frame allows readers to understand and relate to a news story without the
need for extensive background information. The use of stereotypes is a
common way to enhance the familiarity of a news frame.55 The media may
also tell a story in a way that they think readers expect or want it to
unfold.56 Fifth, a story that portrays the unexpected or unusual within
familiar frames is considered more newsworthy. 57  Events that are
surprising attract more attention than those that are routine. A story that is
old or stale is not newsworthy-as one scholar explains, "news is a
depletable consumer product that must be made fresh daily., 58 Sixth, a
story about elites or well-known figures is considered more newsworthy.59
Sometimes the media creates well-known figures-most commonly crime
victims or perpetrators-to enhance the newsworthiness of a story.6°
Newsworkers use these criteria in both selecting and shaping news
stories.61
On a theoretical level, there is a close correspondence between the
doctrinal, rhetorical, and strategic considerations that shape the framing of
tort claims on one hand and the criteria of newsworthiness upon which
journalists rely in constructing the news on the other hand. This should
come as no great surprise. After all, even though they work in very
different institutional settings, both lawyers and journalists are in the
business of constructing persuasive frames for audiences that include both
elites and members of the general public.
Empirical support for this theoretical correspondence between
litigation and news production can be found by examining clergy sexual
abuse litigation. The Gauthe case is a good place to begin. In that case,
the complaint named as defendants:
ARCHBISHOP PHILIP M. HANNAN; BISHOP GERALD L.
FREY; VICAR GENERAL RICHARD VON PUHL
MOUTON; MONSIGNOR HARRY E. BENEFIEL;
MONSIGNOR H. A. LARROQUE; THE ARCHDIOCESE OF
NEW ORLEANS, d/b/a THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH FOR THE
DIOCESE OF LAFAYETTE; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
53 Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 54.
54 Id.; Murdock, supra note 48, at 214.
55 Stanley Cohen, Mods and Rockers: The Inventory as Manufactured News, in THE
MANUFACTURE OF NEWS, supra note 48, at 263, 276.
56 Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 54-55.
5Id. at 55.
58 TUCHMAN, supra note 47, at 31.
59 Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 56.
60 GANS, supra note 49, at 13-15.
61 Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 60-61.
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CHURCH; ST. JOHN PARISH REPRESENTING THE
COMMUNITIES OF ESTHER AND HENRY, VERMILLION
PARISH, LOUISIANA; CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD'S OF LONDON; INTERSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY AND FATHER GILBERT GAUTHE.
By listing first well-known Church officials and institutions, including
"THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH," the title of the case began the
process of framing the sexual abuse committed by Gauthe as an
institutional failure.62
The complaint alleged that Gauthe "recruited, enticed and coerced
numerous young children of the congregation of the aforementioned
Parishes to engage in sex initiation rings under the guise of religious
initiation rites, training and tutelage. 63 This characterization must have
had great cultural resonance against the background of highly publicized
allegations around the country in the early 1980s of childcare workers
running child sex rings and engaging in ritual child sex abuse.64 These
allegations would have been well-known to the judge as well as many, if
not most, prospective jurors.
The most detailed allegations, however, were against Church officials,
whom the plaintiffs asserted "made possible" the abuse by Gauthe by
failing to remove him from ministry or inform parishioners even after the
officials knew of his repeated sexual abuse of children.65 A supplemental
complaint filed by plaintiffs' attorney, J. Minos Simon, further alleged that
"[C]hurch officials made a studied effort to conceal and withhold ...
information concerning Gauthe's misconduct from members and families
of the [C]hurch," and that Church officials, "having full knowledge ... of
his tendencies to sexually abuse young children," moved him from one
parish to another. In doing so, Simon's supplemental complaint concluded
that Church officials "knowingly created an environment which operated
to maximize opportunities for Gauthe to further wantonly sexually abuse
innocent young children." 66  The complaint also referred to Church
officials as "corporate officers," undermining feelings of personal
62 It may be a sign of the court's, or at least the clerk's, sympathy for the Church that the case file
lists the case as "Glen Gastal, et al. versus Interstate Insurance Co., et al." Case file cover page, Gastal
v. Interstate Insurance Co. (La. 15th Dist. Jun. 27, 1984) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
63 Petition for Damages, supra note 15, 10.
64 DAVID HECHLER, THE BATTLE AND THE BACKLASH: THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE WAR, at xiii
(1988) (on sex rings); JENKINS, supra note 6, at 141-42 (on ritual abuse). See generally DEBBIE
NATHAN & MICHAEL SNEDEKER, SATAN'S SILENCE: RITUAL ABUSE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN
AMERICAN WITCH HUNT (1995) (examining, analyzing, and discussing the childcare worker sex ring
claims of the 1980s).
65 Petition for Damages, supra note 15, 23.
66 First Supplemental and Amended Petition 5, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175-A (La. 15th
Dist. Oct. 25, 1984) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
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allegiance to them and making the allegations sound like a typical story of
corporate malfeasance and cover-up.
67
Answers filed by the Church and insurance defendants simply denied
the allegations. They make for much less compelling reading than the
complaint.68 Gauthe's answer alleges that at he was "insane at all times
material" and, therefore, "not legally responsible" for any of the conduct
alleged in the complaint. 69  His answer also argues that he successfully
deceived Church officials by concealing his sexual activity with children-
that the Church, like the children and their parents, was one of Gauthe's
victims. 70  He implies that the Church-like the children and their
parents-was one of Gauthe's victims.
The first print coverage of the Gauthe litigation was published in a
local weekly, the Times of Acadiana, by Barry Yeoman, on November 1,
1984. It was entitled "Is Nothing Sacred?" 71 The article is a feature which
places the Gauthe affair within the context of rising local awareness of
child sexual abuse and community responses to it, and it features a sidebar
focusing on the litigation itself. The sidebar essentially adopts the frame
presented by the plaintiffs' pleadings. The only photograph in the sidebar
is of plaintiffs' attorney, Simon, with a caption that states in large bold
font, "Church officials made a studied effort to conceal Gauthe's
misconduct"-a direct quote from Simon's supplement to the complaint.72
Of the thirty-one paragraphs in the sidebar, thirteen discuss the plaintiffs'
case, quoting extensively from the original complaint and supplement.
Only five paragraphs are dedicated to the defense, all of them based on the
assertions of insanity and deception in Gauthe's answer. In contrast to two
colorful quotes from an interview with Simon, the sidebar states that
"[n]either the Diocese of Lafayette nor the Archdiocese in New Orleans
would comment on the suit."
73
Reading Yeoman's sidebar after having analyzed the pleadings
provides insight into why the news media adopted the frame presented by
the plaintiffs' pleadings. To begin with, the plaintiffs' complaint offers a
dramatic narrative of ritual child sex abuse rings and corporate cover-up, a
67 Petition for Damages, supra note 15, 23()-(m).
68 Answer [on behalf of institutional church defendants], Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175 (La.
15th Dist. Oct. 1, 1984) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Answer [on behalf of insurance
defendants], Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175 (La. 15th Dist. Oct. 16, 1984) (on file with Connecticut
Law Review).
69 Answer on Behalf of Gilbert Gauthe at 1, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175 (La. 15th Dist. Oct.
16, 1984) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).70 Id I 21, 23.
71 Prior to Yeoman's article, print coverage of the Gauthe affair was limited to the criminal
proceedings and consisted of an article by Bruce Schultz published in the Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate, which was adopted by the Associated Press. E-mail from Jason Berry, Author, Lead Us Not
Into Temptation, Catholic Priests and the Sexual Abuse of Children (July 6, 2005 12:53 PM) (on file
with Connecticut Law Review).
72 Barry Yeoman, Is Nothing Sacred?, TIMES OF ACADIANA, Nov. 1, 1984, at 16, 17.
73 Id. at 21.
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stark morality tale with innocent children victimized by an evil sexual
predator and callous corporate officials. The cultural resonance of this
frame, with contemporaneous stories from around the country about child
sex rings, ritual child sex abuse, and corporate wrongdoing and cover-up,
made the frame all the more compelling.74 By contrast, the flat denials in
answers by the Church and insurance defendants did not offer much in the
way of alternative frames. Gauthe's assertions of insanity and deception
did provide an alternative frame, although one with less drama and cultural
resonance than that provided by the plaintiffs. Moreover, Simon's
readiness to speak to the press allowed him to advocate for his frame,
whereas the defense attorneys' refusal to comment did little to promote
their views in the press.
The final paragraph ends by not only reinforcing the plaintiffs' frame,
but also highlighting the importance of drama and cultural familiarity in
Yeoman's adoption of the plaintiffs' frame. "The most interesting aspect
of the Gauthe case," Yeoman concludes, "stands to be the Church's role in
the civil case. Like Paul Newman in The Verdict, attorney Simon will be
trying to establish not only Gauthe's guilt but also the guilt of a seemingly
omnipotent institution., 75 The plaintiffs' frame is compelling, according to
Yeoman, because it has all of the drama of a blockbuster Hollywood
film.
76
The second print article, "Church Knew of Abuses, Sex Case
Depositions Show," by John Pope, appeared on the front page of the New
Orleans Times Picayune on November 9, 1984.77 The headline's adoption
of the plaintiffs' frame was reinforced by the opening paragraph reporting
that "Catholic Church officials knew for almost seven years about the Rev.
Gilbert Gauthe's sexual activities with boys at churches in south-west
Louisiana, according to two depositions filed this week in a court case. 78
Examination of subsequent press coverage illustrates how this frame
cascaded throughout the media-becoming more prominent in later news
stories, being reported more widely, and growing in significance as this
version of the Gauthe litigation itself came to frame the larger phenomenon
of clergy sexual abuse. The influence of the plaintiffs' frame of
institutional failure is illustrated by an Associated Press report of January
25, 1985 entitled, "Bishop Says He Got Word of Gauthe's Actions 10
74 HECHLER, supra note 64, at viii (on sex rings); Kirk Hanson, What The Bishops Failed to Learn
From Corporate Ethics Disasters, in SiN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND
THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 169 (Thomas Plante ed., 2004) (on corporate scandals).
75 Yeoman, supra note 72, at 21.
76 id.
77 John Pope, Church Knew of Abuses, Sex Case Depositions Show, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Nov. 9, 1984, at Al.
78 id.
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Years Ago" which begins, "The bishop of the Catholic Diocese of
Lafayette, in sworn testimony, says he first learned of the Rev. Gilbert
Gauthe's sexual activities with little boys about 10 years before ordering
him suspended."79 Details of Gauthe's actions and mention of his criminal
indictment are relegated to five short paragraphs near the end of the article.
The Times of Acadiana-in May and June of 1985-framed a three-part,
in-depth investigation of the Gauthe litigation by Jason Berry with an
editorial suggesting that "[a]t issue in the final stages of this tragedy are the
troubled lives of dozens of Acadiana families, millions of dollars in
damages claims and the responsibility of the Roman Catholic Church's
Lafayette Diocese for the actions of one of its priests."80
Regional coverage projected the frame of institutional failure to a
larger audience. A May 26, 1985 Dallas Morning News article, on the
front page of the Sunday edition, reported the litigation as a "[c]hild abuse
scandal" and quoted plaintiff Glen Gastal saying, "[a]s far as I'm
concerned, I would like to see the bishop behind bars. He was an
accessory to the crime. He knew about it back in 1973 .... If he had done
something then, this wouldn't have happened to my child.",8' The next
day, the Houston Post ran a story entitled "Parents Say Church Knew
Priest Was Child Molester," which opened with the same quote from
Gastal. 2 The lengthy Dallas Morning News story only briefly mentioned
the defendants' assertion that they were themselves deceived by Gauthe,
and this alternative frame is missing altogether from the shorter Houston
Post article. 3 The Dallas Morning News article also uses the Gauthe
litigation to frame a listing of similar cases around the country-in Idaho,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-provided by
plaintiffs' attorney Simon.
4
National coverage began with two investigative articles in the June 7,
1985 edition of the National Catholic Reporter. A front-page editorial
introduces the articles. The opening sentence of the editorial explains that
"[i]n cases throughout the nation, the Catholic Church is facing scandals
and being forced to pay millions of dollars in claims to families whose
sons have been molested by Catholic priests," lending a sense of
magnitude to the issue by suggesting that clergy sexual abuse was national
79 Bishop Says He Got Word of Gauthe's Actions 10 Years Ago, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan 25,
1985, at 8b.
go Editors, The Tragedy of Gilbert Gauthe, TIMES OF ACADIANA, May 23, 1985, at 18, 18
(emphasis added) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
81 Steve Blow, Priest Indicted: Child Abuse Scandal Underscores Homosexual Issue Among
Clergy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 1985, at 1A, available at 1985 WLNR 13299150.
82 UPI, Parents Say Church Knew Priest Was Child Molester, HOUSTON POST, May 27, 1985, at
18A, available at LEXIS, News Library, DALLASMN File.
83 Blow, supra note 81; UPI, supra note 82.
4 Blow, supra note 81.
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in scope.85 The second paragraph goes on to place responsibility for this
national problem on the Church, suggesting that, beyond the harm suffered
by victims and damage to the Church's reputation, "a related and broader
scandal seemingly rests with local Bishops and a national episcopal
leadership that has, as yet, no set policy on how to respond to these
cases." 86 The last paragraph emphasizes the primacy of institutional failure
over individual instances of abuse:
[T]he tragedy, and scandal, as [the National Catholic
Reporter] sees it, is not only with the actions of the individual
priests-these are serious enough-but with church
structures in which bishops, chanceries and seminaries fail to
respond to complaints, or even engage in cover-ups; sadly,
keeping the affair quiet has usually assumed greater
importance than any possible effect on the victims
themselves.8 7
This frame of institutional failure presented by the National Catholic
Reporter editors was itself derived from their knowledge of the specific
cases in the two investigative articles, in which the Gauthe litigation was
the most extensively researched and the most prominently featured. 8 And,
as we have seen, the version of the Gauthe case in the news media was that
of the plaintiffs. Thus, the plaintiffs' framing of clergy sexual abuse in the
Gauthe case came not only to dominate local, regional, and national press
coverage of that particular case, but of the whole nationwide phenomenon
of clergy sexual abuse.
The National Catholic Reporter coverage began a frame cascade
through the national media.89 On June 9, the Washington Post ran a story
on the Gauthe litigation, borrowing heavily from prior coverage by the
Times of Acadiana and the National Catholic Reporter.9" On June 20, the
New York Times published a story on the Gauthe litigation, quoting the
National Catholic Reporter editorial emphasizing the institutional failure
85 Priest Child Abuse Cases Victimizing Families; Bishops Lack Policy Response, NAT'L CATH.
REP., June 7, 1985, at 1.
86 Id.
SId. at4.
88 The first article, to which Berry contributed research, begins with the Gauthe case and goes on
to discuss several other similar cases from around the country. Arthur Jones, Legal Actions Against
Pedophile Priests Grow as Frustrated and Angry Parents Seek Remedies, NAT'L CATH. REP., June 7,
1985, at 4. The second article, written by Berry, is exclusively dedicated to the Gauthe case, and is a
shorter version of his three-part series for the Times ofAcadiana. Jason Berry, Pedophile Priest. Study
in Inept Church Response, NAT'L CATH. REP., June 7, 1985, at 6.9 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 65.
90 Kathy Sawyer, Priest's Child-Molestation Case Traumatizes Catholic Community, WASH.
POST, June 9, 1985, at A6, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
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over Gauthe's individual actions.9' In its July 1 issue, Time Magazine
published a short item on the Gauthe litigation, citing the Times of
Acadiana series and the National Catholic Reporter coverage as its
primary sources. 92 Thus, the use of other news organizations as sources-
which were highly influenced by the plaintiffs' framing of the issue-
fueled the cascading of this frame throughout the national media.
In later coverage of the issue over the next two decades, the Gauthe
litigation acquired special status as "the seminal case" of clergy sexual
abuse.93 As national coverage of the scandal reached its peak in late 2002,
the Associated Press published a list of "key dates in the abuse crisis in the
U.S. Roman Catholic Church," the first significant entry being the Gauthe
case in 1985. 94 The Gauthe litigation is still the invariable first term in
frequent litanies of notorious cases, including the Porter and Geoghan
cases.
9 5
The focus on Church officials' institutional responsibility, rather than
on the individual culpability of the abusers, remained a dominant theme in
later coverage. For example, one of the first Boston Globe stories on the
Porter case was entitled "Some Fault Church on Sex Abuse by Priests,"
and it began as follows: "Despite continuing disclosures about sexual
misconduct by its priests ... the Catholic Church is not responding to the
problem as aggressively or as uniformly as other religious
denominations."'9  The Globe followed this article with another a few days
later, which framed clergy sexual abuse as an instance of corporate
misconduct. The article quoted a Porter victim who, in explaining his
reason for filing suit against the diocese, opined that "we all know that
huge corporations-and that includes the Catholic Church--often don't
change their behavior until they get hurt financially.,
97
Television coverage of the Porter case also emphasized the frame of
the Church's institutional responsibility. In February 1993, ABC's
Nightline aired the first of many examinations of clergy sexual abuse.
Host Ted Koppel introduced the broadcast by stating: "For years, the
9' Jon Nordheimer, Sex Charges Against Priest Embroil Louisiana Parents, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1985, at A24, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
92 Painful Secrets; Priests Accused of Pederasty, TIME, July 1, 1985, at 51.
93 See, e.g., Bruce Nolan, Bishops to Revise Rules on Sex Abuse; Retroactive "'-Strike " Policy
Among Church Proposals, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, June 13, 2002, at 1, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NOTPIC File.
94 Chronology: Church Sex-Abuse Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,72919,00.html.
95 E.g., Alan Cooperman & Rob Stein, Pedophile Ex-Priest Is Killed In Prison; Fellow Inmate
Strangled Geoghan, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2003, at A], available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST
File. A LEXIS search of print and broadcast news items in 2002 in the "News, All (English, Full
Text)" data base produced twenty-five news items that mentioned Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan in the
same story (last searched Oct. 3, 2006).
96 Alison Bass, Some Fault Church on Sex Abuse by Priests, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 1992, at 1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
97 Alison Bass, Law Limits Church Liability to $20,000; Victims of Abuse Criticize Statute,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1992, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
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Church looked the other way."98 In a subsequent Nightline broadcast in
December of that year, host Chris Wallace began the show by suggesting
that while Porter's abuse of children was shocking, "[e]ven worse ... the
Catholic Church transferred him from one parish to another, finally into
treatment, and then back to a church." 99 In March 1993, the CBS show 60
Minutes broadcast a segment on clergy sexual abuse in the Archdiocese of
New Mexico under the title: "The Archbishop: Cover Up by Roman
Catholic Church of Pedophilia by its Priests." Host Mike Wallace
pointedly asked the mother of two boys abused by a New Mexico priest,
"Do you hold the archbishop responsible for all of this?" to which she
replied, "A hundred percent. '"' ° Similar examples can be found on ABC's
Primetime Live,'0' and a CNN special report.' 0
The frame of institutional responsibility was even more pronounced in
coverage of the Geoghan case and its aftermath in Boston. A January 2002
Boston Globe article, entitled "Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for
Years," is typical:
Now, as Geoghan faces the first of two criminal trials
next week, details about his sexual compulsion are likely to
be overshadowed by a question that many Catholics find
even more troubling: Why did it take a succession of three
cardinals and many bishops 34 years to place children out of
Geoghan's reach?
10 3
In television coverage, ABC's Nightline led the field in hammering
away throughout 2002 on the theme of the Church's institutional
responsibility. In a January episode on the Geoghan case, host Chris Bury
invoked the familiar frame of corporate misconduct, saying that "parallels
98 Nightline: Child Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church (ABC television broadcast Feb. 24,
1993), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
99 Nightline (ABC television broadcast Dec. 6, 1993), available at LEXIS, News Library,
ABCNEW File.
100 60 Minutes: The Archbishop: Coverup by Roman Catholic Church of Pedophilia by its Priests
(CBS television broadcast Mar. 21, 1993), available at LEXIS, News Library, CBSNEW File.
101 Primetime Live: Secret No More Follow-Up (ABC television broadcast July 23, 1992),
available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File. Host Diane Sawyer explained that Catholics in
one community were "in a state of outrage... not just because of Father Porter and what he did twenty
years ago, but [also because] the Church ... deceived its own diocese." Id.
CNN Specials: Fall From Grace, Part 1-Clergy Pedophilia Revealed (CNN television
broadcast Nov. 14, 1993), available at LEXIS, News Library, CNNTRN File. Host Bonnie Anderson
introduced the topic by explaining that "[t]he Roman Catholic Church in the United States is in
unparalleled turmoil" over clergy sexual abuse. Id. The show included an extensive interview with
activist Bonnie Miller who suggested that "the subsequent abuse by the institution was more
destructive" than the initial abuse by an individual priest. CNN Specials: Fall From Grace, Part 4-
Alleged Victims Band Together (CNN television broadcast Nov. 14, 1993), available at LEXIS, News
Library, CNNTRN File.
103 Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
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to the Enron debacle are striking." 1 4  In the same broadcast, he
suggestively asked General Counsel for the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) Mark Chopko, "How much responsibility does
the Catholic Church have for the actions of its priests?"' ' In a February
episode, host Ted Koppel began with the question: "What can be done that
will restore confidence in the ability of the institution to clean house?"'
6
In March, Bury introduced a show by stating: "At one time, the Roman
Catholic Church could confidently proclaim that individual cases of
sexually abusive priests were just that: Bad apples, aberrations, isolated
examples. That argument is getting harder to make.' 0 7 A second show on
the topic in March focused on the claims of "critics" asserting that "[f]or
too long ... the Roman Catholic Church protected its priests."'' 08 In April,
Bury introduced a broadcast, titled "Turning a Blind Eye: Victims and
Families of Sex Abuse by Catholic Priests hold Boston Cardinal Law
Responsible," by asserting that "the cover-up can be far more damaging
than the crime."' 09 During a second show on the topic in April, Koppel
peppered Washington, D.C. Archbishop Cardinal Theodore McCarrick
with questions about "responsibility among the princes of the Church and
among the bishops" and their active participation in "a cover-up, moving
priests from one location to another" and "the general public perception,
now... of a church that has handled this thing very poorly.' '1 10 In June,
Koppel opened the program by summarizing the current state of the
scandal in Boston as follows: "Former priest, John Geoghan, imprisoned.
Former priest, Paul Shanley, charged with child rape. Cardinal Law,
accused of cover-up.""' This placed Cardinal Law on par with the
nation's most notorious clergy sexual abusers. Indeed, Cardinal Law
eventually eclipsed Geoghan as ABC's Good Morning America deemed
him "the man at the center of" the Catholic Church's sexual abuse
104 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: Interview with Mark Chopko & Jason Berry (ABC television
broadcast Jan. 28, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
105 Id.
106 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: Catholic Church Deals with Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests
in Wake of Former Priest, John Geoghan, being Charged with Sexual Abuse and Sentenced to Prison
(ABC television broadcast Feb. 21, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File
[hereinafter Nightline: Sins of the Fathers; Catholic Church Deals].
107 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: The Rising Costs of the Scandal (ABC television broadcast
Mar. 14,2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
108 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: Spiritual Treatment, Secular Justice (ABC television broadcast
Mar. 25, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
109 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: Turning a Blind Eye (ABC television broadcast Apr. 9, 2002),
available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
110 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: Trying to Repair the Breach (ABC television broadcast Apr. 24,
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
1 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: A National Accounting (ABC television broadcast June 11,
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
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scandal. 12 On the June Nightline program, Koppel lectured Minneapolis
Archbishop Harry Flynn, chairman of the USCCB's ad hoc committee on
sexual abuse, on the feelings of American Catholics about the scandal:
The disappointment, Your Excellency, if I may suggest,
it seems to be not so much about the behavior of the priests
themselves-of course there is great anger about that-but
about the failure of the establishment of the American
Catholic--of the Catholic Church in America to do
something about it.'t
3
To which the Archbishop replied, "And I would agree 100 percent
with that."'" 4  In a second June program on the issue, Koppel concluded
that in developing policies to detect and punish abusive priests, the Bishops
had "finessed" the issue of disciplining Bishops who had facilitated
abuse. 15 In December, Nightline wrapped up its 2002 coverage of the
issue with a program on Cardinal Law's resignation and its implications
for other Bishops. 1 6  The frame of institutional responsibility appeared
prominently on ABC's Good Morning America117 and 20/20;' 8 and CBS's
60 Minutes,"9 60 Minutes ii,120 and Sunday Morning.'
21
112 Good Morning America: Cardinal Law Resignation (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 13,
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
113 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: A National Accounting, supra note I11.
H14 Id.
115 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers: A Parish Loses Its Priest (ABC television broadcast June 27,
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File.
116 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers (ABC television broadcast Dec. 13, 2002), available at LEXIS,
News Library, ABCNEW File.
117 See, e.g., Good Morning America: Bishop Wilton Gregory Discusses the New U.S. Catholic
Church Policy to Deal With Sexual Abuse (ABC television broadcast June 17, 2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File ("[The Church was] soundly criticized for not taking prompt
action."); Good Morning America: Cardinals Return to U.S. after Meeting with the Pope on Sexual
Abuse Scandal (ABC television broadcast Apr. 25, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library,
ABCNEW File (opening with "Boston's Bernard Law, whose mismanagement of abusive priests
helped create this scandal"); Good Morning America: Father George Spagnolia Discusses Case of
Sexual Abuse Brought by Former Parishioner (ABC television broadcast Feb. 27, 2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File ("All this year, we have been watching the Catholic Church
confront disclosures that priests accused of sexual molestation continued to serve, often moved from
parish to parish. ... Church officials, including Cardinal Bernard Law, came under fire for allowing
Geoghan to continue working for years, despite knowing he was a pedophile."); Good Morning
America: Mark Serrano and Other Victims of Abuse by Priest Talk to Father Frank Roddhammer
about What Could Have and Still Should be Done to Stop Abuse by Priests (ABC television broadcast
Apr. 23, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File (showing "a group of men as they
confront a bishop they say let a predator inflict so much pain on them years ago"); Good Morning
America: Monsignor Clement Connolly, from Los Angeles, Discusses Changes Needed in Wake of
Sexual Abuse Scandal in Catholic Church (ABC television broadcast Mar. 19, 2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File ("In California, a prominent monsignor is calling on Church
leaders to be accountable and to change everything."); Good Morning America: Victims of Priest
Sexual Abuse Get Chance to Meet with Bishops in Dallas at Catholic Bishops Conference (ABC
television broadcast June 13, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File (Mark Serrano
"organized a group that confronted a bishop who had protected a priest who had abused him").
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Aside from this anecdotal evidence, there is some statistical support for
the predominance of the institutional responsibility frame. A LexisNexis
search of New York Times news stories on clergy sexual abuse in 1993,
during intensive coverage of a number of cases around the country sparked
by the Porter case, found reference to the role of Bishops in twenty-four of
thirty-two articles (75%).122 A similar search for 2002 during media
coverage of the Geoghan and other cases found reference to the role of
Bishops in 488 of 604 articles (76%).123
A number of factors supported this frame of institutional
responsibility. First, news coverage of the Gauthe litigation provided a
template for later coverage. 24 For example, in a June 2002 broadcast of 60
Minutes II, host Ed Bradley opened the program with the question, "Why
is it taking the Roman Catholic leadership so long to make the church safe
for its children?" "We found some answers," Bradley suggested, "in
Louisiana, in a case which could have taught the church nearly everything
it needed to know about that nineteen years ago.' '125  The program then
combined old news footage of the Gauthe case and interviews with parties
to the litigation and their attorneys to frame the discussion of the Bishops'
response to clergy sexual abuse in 2002.126
Second, many news stories relied on the expertise of individuals
involved in the Gauthe case, most notably journalist Jason Berry, whose
analysis of clergy sexual abuse was shaped by his own coverage of the
118 20/20: Christopher Dixon and Others Claim Sexual Abuse by Pedophile Catholic Priests
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 22, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File. Host
Barbara Walters introduced the segment by suggesting that "the sins of the fathers are rocking the
foundations of the church." Id.
"9 60 Minutes: Catholic Church Dealing with Issues of Sex, Priests Abusing Children and Birth
Control (CBS television broadcast Mar. 31, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, CBSNEW File.
Commentator Andy Rooney concluded: "It seems as though the Catholic Church should change its
rules." Id.
120 60 Minutes H: The Church on Trial (CBS television broadcast June 12, 2002), available at
LEXIS, News Library, CBSNEW File ("Why is it taking the Roman Catholic leadership so long to
make the church safe for its childrenT').
121 Sunday Morning: New Priests in Catholic Church Will Have to Earn Trust (CBS television
broadcast Apr. 21, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, CBSNEW File (focusing on the way the
"church has handled the sexual abuse scandal").
122 I used the search terms "date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) and (bishop or
archbishop or cardinal) and not substance or alcohol or drug or military or 'human fights' or spouse or
husband or army or guerillas or labor" to generate the first figure, and "date is 1993 and (priest or
clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) and not substance or alcohol or drug or military or 'human rights' or
spouse or husband or army or guerillas or labor" to generate the second figure. For both, I excluded
articles that were not on topic, and I did not count articles that appeared more than once in the search
results (last searched Aug. 15, 2006).
123 See supra note 122 (determined by using the same search methodology, but changing the year
to 2002).
124 On media templates, see JENNY KITZINGER, FRAMING ABUSE: MEDIA INFLUENCE AND PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 54--78 (2004).
125 60 Minutes II: The Church on Trial, supra note 120.
126 Id.
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case. Berry was quoted extensively throughout the print media.' 27  A
LexisNexis search of the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago
Tribune, and Los Angeles Times between 1990 and 2004 produced eighty-
two Berry quotations and citations. 28  A 2002 Washington Post article
referred to Berry as "a figure of legend in the coverage of sexual abuse by
priests. ' ' 129  Berry appeared on Nightline as an expert on clergy sexual
abuse in 1993, twice in 2002, and then once again in 2003.130
Third, a steady flow of subsequent legal claims that highlighted the
failures of Church officials provided the basis for news stories. Following
the Gauthe case, hundreds of clergy sexual abuse lawsuits between 1984
and 2002 named Church officials as defendants. Some of these later
claims were modeled explicitly on the Gauthe case. Others were
influenced less directly by interest in institutional liability for clergy sexual
abuse among a growing circle of plaintiffs' lawyers that was fueled, in
part, by the widely publicized success of the Gauthe case as well other
concurrent cases that garnered less publicity. We will return to this
mobilizing effect of the Gauthe litigation on plaintiffs' attorneys later.
31
2. Reliance on Litigation Documents and Plaintiffs' Attorneys as
News Sources
Audience demand is not the only ingredient of newsworthiness. In
order to get published, a story must also be credible. According to one
British broadcaster, "[c]redibility ... is the sine qua non of news.'' 132
Credibility is the key to the power of journalism as an authoritative source
of information.
Journalists rely on sources to provide information and to promote the
credibility of their stories. Sources that are themselves perceived as
credible are especially attractive to journalists. Hence, news stories
127 See, e.g., Leslie Bermetts, Unholy Alliances, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 1991, at 224, 227; David
Hechler, Sins of the Father: A Girl's Abuse by Her Priest, MCCALL'S, Sept. 1993, at 113, 118; Richard
N. Ostling, Sins of the Fathers: A Honolulu Bishop is Accused of Sex Abuse in a Federal Lawsuit As
Catholic Scandals Keep Spreading, TIME, Aug. 19, 1991, at 51. For further discussion of the use of
journalists and prior coverage as sources for news stories, see infra Part I1.C.2.
128 1 used the search terms "(priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) and 'jason berry' and not
substance or alcohol or drug or military or 'human rights' or spouse or husband or army or guerillas or
labor and date (geq (Jan. 1, 1990) and leq (Dec. 31, 2004))" (last searched July 18, 2006).
129 Steve Twomey, For 3 Who Warned Church, Fears Borne Out: Priest, Journalist and
Professor Who Foresaw Sex Abuse Scandal Frustrated by Bishops' Response, WASH. POST, June 13,
2002, at A], available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
30 See Nightline: Child Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, supra note 98; Nightline: Sins of
the Fathers (ABC television broadcast June 17, 2003), available at LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW
File; Nightline: Sins of the Fathers; Catholic Church Deals, supra note 106; Nightline: Sins of the
Fathers, supra note 104.
' 3 See infra Part III.A.I.c.
132 TUCHMAN, supra note 47, at 83 (quoting Anthony Smith, British newscaster) (emphasis
added).
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commonly quote official documents. They also regularly rely on experts
or officials. 33 The media not only rely on experts, they also create them,
because sources themselves gain credibility by being cited as experts in the
media.134 Expert opinion ratifies a news story, and media coverage ratifies
the expert's opinion. Using experts and officials to boost the credibility of
news stories enhances the prominence of news media frames by attributing
them to respected figures.
A second reason for the news media's adoption of the plaintiffs'
framing of clergy sexual abuse is heavy reliance on litigation documents as
sources for news stories, supplemented by interviews with plaintiffs and
their attorneys. Pleadings, depositions, discovery documents, and trial
transcripts-either filed in court and available as public documents or
provided directly to reporters by lawyers-are treated by journalists as
authoritative sources of information. Journalists and the public at large
tend to view legal documents as especially credible. Perhaps one
explanation for this phenomenon is that pleadings are supposed to contain
only facts with a sufficient evidentiary basis, and depositions and trial
testimony are given under oath. It may also be that filing documents in a
court gives them an official status that inspires confidence in the
truthfulness of their contents. There may also be an element of naive belief
that individuals involved in legal proceedings do not lie. Whatever the
case may be, litigation documents provide the credibility that journalists
seek in their sources and are thus often the origin of news frames.
Media coverage of clergy sexual abuse relies heavily on litigation
documents as primary sources for news stories. One regularly finds news
stories based on pleadings, depositions, discovery documents, and trial
transcripts. As we have seen, Barry Yeoman's initial print coverage of the
Gauthe litigation in the Times of Acadiana was based almost entirely on
the plaintiffs' pleadings. In a recent interview, Yeoman recalled that
"there was a sense in the newsroom that we should cover the story
responsibly.., to write about childhood sex abuse as a broader issue and
discuss the civil case in a factual, dispassionate sidebar.' ' 135 The sidebar
was "written almost entirely from pleadings as a way to give the
community a sense that we were just reporting the facts, rather than
inflaming passions." "The editor," he explained, "was a stickler for using
the court record as the primary source [based on] a sense that if you quote
from court documents you are less open to a libel suit than if you quote an
individual." Yeoman suggested that in "hewing to the structure of the
133 See SCHUDSON, supra note 48, at 54; TUCHMAN, supra note 47, at 90 (noting that journalists
"intermesh fact and source").
1 See TUCHMAN, supra note 47, at 92-93.
135 Telephone Interview with Barry Yeoman, Writer, Times ofAcadiana, in Albany, NY (Jan. 12,
2005) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
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lawsuits," the story was "based on the plaintiffs' original assertions" and
"framed by the plaintiffs' framing of the issue."
136
John Pope's subsequent story in the New Orleans Times Picayune was
based on and quoted extensively from depositions that were filed by
plaintiffs' attorney Simon precisely in order to put them into the public
record and make them accessible to the press. 37  In an interview, Pope
suggested that he was merely reporting what he found in the public record.
You just go out and "see what you find," he explained, "you don't go into
a story with an idefixe.' 3 8 Of his heavy reliance on the depositions, he
said: "it is sworn testimony, testimony under oath, not just someone on the
street talking about vague details. You want information that you feel you
can take to the bank."'' 39 Subsequent local, regional, and national coverage
of the case regularly cites the same pleadings, depositions, and, in later
coverage, trial testimony. 40  In the National Catholic Reporter's early
investigative articles, information about cases of clergy sexual abuse from
around the country was based almost entirely on litigation documents . 41
One finds frequent reliance on litigation documents and proceedings in
later coverage as well. For example, the Boston Globe's first article on the
Porter case relied heavily on a demand letter written to the diocese by
plaintiffs' attorney, Roderick MacLeish, Jr., on behalf of a group of nine
victims. 42 The Globe's Pulitzer Prize winning coverage of clergy sexual
abuse in 2002 was based largely on sealed court files in the Geoghan case
that the paper successfully litigated to have unsealed. 1
43
A LexisNexis search of New York Times news stories on clergy sexual
abuse in 1993, found explicit reference to litigation documents or
proceedings in twenty-two out of forty-four articles (50%). 44 A similar
136 id.
137 See John Pope, Church Knew of Abuses, Sex Case Depositions Show, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE, Nov. 9, 1984, at A l; see also SIMON, supra note 16, at 146.
138 Telephone Interview with John Pope, Writer, New Orleans Times Picayune, in Albany, NY
(Jan. 6, 2005) (on file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter Pope Interview].
139 id.
140 See, e.g., Associated Press, Bishop Says He Got Word of Gauthe's Actions 10 Years Ago,
BATON ROUGE MORNING ADvoc., Jan. 25, 1985, at B8; Blow, supra note 81; Sawyer, supra note 90.
141 See, e.g., Jason Berry, Pedophile Priest: Study in Inept Church Response, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
June 7, 1985, at 6, 6; Arthur Jones, Legal Actions Against Pedophile Priests Grow, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
June 7, 1985, at 1,4.
142 Alison Bass, Nine Allege Priest Abused Them, Threaten to Sue Church, BOSTON GLOBE, May
8, 1992, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
"43 See THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 262 (paperback ed. 2003).
144 I used the search terms "date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/1 5 abus! or moles!) and (lawsuit!
or plaintiff, or court! or pleading! or deposition! or testimon! or discovery or trial!) and not substance
or alcohol or drug or military or "human rights" or spouse or husband or army or guerillas or labor" to
generate the first figure and "date is 1993 and (priest or clergy w/I5 abus! or moles!) and not substance
or alcohol or drug or military or "human rights" or spouse or husband or army or guerillas or labor" to
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search for 2002 found explicit mention of litigation documents or
proceedings in 312 out of 692 articles (45%). 145 Of course, these figures
under-represent reliance on litigation as a news source since they include
only stories that explicitly mention litigation documents or proceedings.
The leading books on the clergy sex abuse scandal-all by
journalists-also rely heavily on litigation documents. Jason Berry states
in the introduction to Lead Us Not Into Temptation, "[c]ivil lawsuits
provided the documentation on most of the cases I wrote about," "the
baseline on which I built my reporting," and he discloses in the prologue,
"[m]y primary sources were transcripts of civil testimony given under oath
by Bishops and priests in lawsuits across the country."' 46 In their book
Gospel of Shame, New York Times reporter Frank Bruni and free lance
journalist Elinor Burkett acknowledge "J. Minos Simon, who actually let
us take three fifty-pound boxes of his files to a hotel room for the
weekend.' 47 The notes to their book suggest that they relied most heavily
on news reports of the cases that they covered, which were themselves
largely based on litigation documents. 48 The Investigative Staff of the
Boston Globe, who won a Pulitzer prize for their coverage of the scandal,
explains in the notes to their book Betrayal that they relied heavily "on a
large number of Church documents filed in connection with criminal and
civil court cases."'149 David France, who covered the story for Newsweek
magazine, states in the notes to his book Our Fathers, "[m]y key resource
for this book was tens of thousands of pages of court documents ...
[especially] the extensive record of court depositions."' 5 °
In both news stories and books, these documentary sources are
supplemented with interviews. As we have seen, interviews with
plaintiffs' attorney Simon were often quoted in news stories about the
Gauthe litigation, and he is acknowledged as a key source in the books by
Berry and Bruni and Burkett.' Plaintiffs' attorneys figure prominently in
news stories and in lists of attorneys interviewed for the books. 5 2 These
plaintiffs' attorneys functioned as what media scholars call
"parajournalists"--organizational spokespersons whose job it is to provide
generate the second figure. For both, I did not count articles that appeared more than once in the search
results (last searched Aug. 9, 2005).
145 I used the same search methodology as supra note 144, changing the year to 2002 (last
searched Sept. 28, 2006).
i46 BERRY, supra note 1, at ix, xxii, 47.
147 BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at vii-viii.
141 Id. at 269 n.142.
141 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 262. The Globe's 2002
coverage was itself sparked by the filing of claims against Fr. Geoghan. See Michael Rezendes,
Scandal: The Boston Globe and Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, in SIN AGAINST THE
INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1, 4 (Thomas
Plante ed., 2004).
:50 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 599.
1'1 BERRY, supra note 1, at xxvii; BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at vii-viii.
152 BERRY, supra note 1, at xxvi-xxvii; BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at vii-viii.
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ready-made news stories to journalists. 5 3  In perhaps the most extreme
example, in April 2002, plaintiffs' attorney Eric MacLeish held a
previously announced news conference in the ballroom of the Sheraton
Boston Hotel and Towers. The conference lasted over two hours, complete
with victim testimonials and a Power Point presentation of eighty-seven
documents relating to claims against Father Paul Shanley, at the end of
which MacLeish distributed 800-page document packets to dozens of
journalists in attendance. 54  Plaintiffs themselves are also frequently
quoted in news stories, either in sworn testimony or personal interviews.
By contrast, defense attorneys-especially Church and insurance company
attorneys-regularly refused comment, as did Church officials.
In general, plaintiffs lawyers, and to a lesser degree plaintiffs
themselves, are eager to speak with reporters and publicize their cases-
providing ready-made frames for the press-because it serves their
litigation goals. 155 Favorable publicity in the media can influence potential
jurors. When news stories adopt the plaintiffs' frames, they make those
frames more familiar, and hence more persuasive, to jurors exposed to
them in media coverage. The long-term effects of such publicity are
especially powerful. Whereas once it might have been difficult to
convince judges and juries that a Catholic priest could be capable of
sexually abusing children, in the wake of twenty years of highly publicized
litigation, this is no longer the case. Press coverage can also increase
settlement pressure on defendants eager to staunch the flow of
embarrassing information to the public. Throughout the scandal, the
Church has entered into confidential settlements in order to avoid negative
publicity. 56  Press interviews also enable plaintiffs to air their claims
against the Church publicly, a common goal of plaintiffs in clergy sex
abuse litigation.1 57 Finally, plaintiffs' attorneys often seek to enhance their
reputations, and getting the plaintiffs' story reported in a favorable light
serves this end.
By contrast, the Church has been eager to avoid press coverage
altogether for fear initially of igniting and later fueling public scandal. 58
153 SCHUDSON, supra note 48, at 3, 138.
154 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 395-401.
155 See, e.g., Mather, supra note 5, at 917 (discussing plaintiffs' lawyers cultivation of press
coverage in tobacco litigation). But see HALTOM, supra note 43, at 207-10 (asserting that civil lawyers
shun publicity and are not considered as reliable sources by journalists).
' INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 47.
157 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 16, at 138-39.
158 For a lengthy analysis of the church hierarchy's desire to avoid publicity, see Barbara Balboni,
Through the "Lens" of the Organizational Culture Perspective: A Descriptive Study of American
Catholic Bishops' Understanding of Clergy Sexual Molestation and Abuse of Children and Adolescents
(Sept. 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bridgewater State College), available at http://webhost.
bridgew.edu/bbalboni/dissertation.htm. The asymmetry between plaintiff and defense attitudes toward
media coverage may also be based on differences in professional culture and client confidentiality
2007]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
This reluctance of defendants and their attorneys to speak with the press
has made their compulsory testimony in litigation documents-such as
depositions and trial transcripts-all the more influential as a source for
media coverage. This further benefits plaintiffs, as this testimony is
elicited by plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to use it to support their frames.
3. Litigation as an Unfolding Drama
In the news production process, a news story with continuity, that
unfolds over time and can be released in episodes, is considered more
newsworthy. 5 9 Such an ongoing story is said in news jargon to "have
legs.' 60 The protracted and dramatic nature of the litigation process lends
litigation frames continuity and enhances their newsworthiness.
16 1
The litigation process gave the clergy sex abuse story legs because it
generated a steady flow of litigation events that each provided new
revelations and pegs for news stories. In the Gauthe litigation, for
example, the filing of pleadings, the taking of depositions, hearings on
motions, trial events, appeals, and settlements all gave rise to media
stories. 162 In this manner, subsequent lawsuits since 1985 have supported
coverage of clergy sexual abuse for the past twenty years.
163
At times, the drama of the litigation itself-the competition between
attorneys-sustains the coverage. Part two of Berry's 1985 three-part
investigative series in the Times of Acadiana examines the "legal dramas
unfolding as a result of [Gauthe's] crimes," and features on the first page,
side-by-side photos of plaintiffs' attorney Simon and defense attorney
concerns. Plaintiffs' lawyers are story-tellers by profession who often like to talk and, as they do not
bill by the hour, are freer with their time. By contrast, defense attorneys more regularly play the role of
confidential counselors and are less willing to take time to chat about cases. In addition, a plaintiffs'
lawyer with many clients can talk in general terms without breaching client confidentiality, whereas
defense attorneys usually have one large client-such as a diocese--and may find it harder to speak in
general terms without breaching client confidentiality. I am grateful to Howard Erichson for these
insights. For an example of defense counsel's refusal to speak to the press in the Gauthe case, see
Sawyer, supra note 90. For discussion of plaintiffs' lawyers' cultivation of the media in tobacco
litigation, see Mather, supra note 5, at 917.
159 Galtung & Ruge, supra note 50, at 55.
160 SCHUDSON, supra note 48, at 180.
161 Cf HALTOM, supra note 43, at 210, 216, 235 (asserting that civil litigation lacks news pegs
and legs).
162 See, e.g., Jason Berry, Church Accepts Liability, TIMES OF ACADIANA, July 18, 1985, at 16 (on
file with Connecticut Law Review) (citing stipulation of church liability); David McCormick, Church
On Trial For Allegedly Harboring Priest in Sex Abuse Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 1986,
available at LexisNexis Academic, News Wires (citing jury selection); David McCormick, Mother:
Faith Shattered After Son Molested by Priest, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 1986, available at
LexisNexis Academic, News Wires (citing trial testimony); Dave Miller, Decision Reached in Priest
Sex Suit, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADvoc., Feb. 8, 1986, at B I (citing jury verdict); Pope, supra note
77, at Al (citing depositions); Staff, Sex Abuse Damage Trial Goes to Jury Today, DAILY ADVERTISER,
Feb. 7, 1986 (citing submission to jury) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Yeoman, supra note
72, at 17 (citing pleadings).
163 See infra Parts II.D, III.A.l.b.ii.
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F. Ray Mouton.164 Next to each photo, is a bold caption in large font. The
one next to Simon reads: "Attorney Minos Simon's suit on behalf of the
Gastals rests on the premise that Church officials not only had prior
knowledge of Gauthe's crimes but also had long tolerated homosexuality
among other clerics in the sprawling diocese," and the one next to Mouton
states that "Defense attorney F. Ray Mouton has entered an insanity plea to
Gauthe's criminal indictment. The jury will have to decide if the priest
was capable of telling right from wrong at the time he molested his
victims.' 65 The photos and their captions illustrate nicely that litigation is
essentially frame competition in which articulate attorneys engage in
drawn out and, at times, dramatic conflict, all of which makes for an
attractive news story.
Subsequent coverage also played up the drama of litigation. CNN
Anchor Bonnie Anderson characterized the filing of a countersuit for
defamation against a plaintiff "just the start of the Archdiocese
counterattack.' ' 66 Videotaped depositions of Cardinal Law in the Geoghan
and Shanley cases were posted on the Web by the Boston Globe, and
dramatic excerpts were played on the evening news and included in
newspaper stories.
67
4. Clergy Sexual Abuse as a News Theme
In addition to audience demand and credibility, editorial concerns
influence news production. In composing the daily paper or news
program, editors must select and organize news stories. In order to do so,
they employ themes that provide selection criteria and principles of
organization. "A news theme," explains media scholar Mark Fishman, "is
a unifying concept. It presents a specific news event, or a number of such
events in terms of some broader concept .... A news theme allows
journalists to cast an incident as an instance of something."'' 68 The extent
to which a particular story fits within a theme makes it more newsworthy.
16 Jason Berry, The Tragedy of Gilbert Gauthe, Part II, TIMES OF ACADIANA, May 30, 1985, at
16, 16.
165 Id.
16 CNN Specials: Fall From Grace, Part 2 Clergy Protectionism (CNN television broadcast Nov.
14, 1993), available at LEXIS, News Library, CNNTRN File.
167 Boston Globe, Documents: Abuse in the Catholic Church, Depositions of Cardinal Law,
available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/documents/law-depositions.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2007). For excerpts from the depositions broadcast on television, see, for example, CBS
Morning News: Videotape Shows Boston's Cardinal Bernard Law Knew of Secretive Church Policy
when Dealing with Abusive Priests (CBS television broadcast Aug. 14, 2002), available at LEXIS,
News Library, CBSNEW File. For deposition excerpts in print media see, for example, Pam Belluck,
Cardinal Law Said His Policy Shielded Priests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
168 Mark Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, in THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS, supra note 50, at
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The development of themes over time enhances the continuity of the news
and allows news organizations to frame individual stories as episodes
within an unfolding drama.
69
The tendency to select news stories that fit a theme applies not only
within a particular news organization, but among news organizations as a
whole. Once one media outlet has identified a theme, other news
organizations are likely to view it as newsworthy and to report on it as
well. As we have seen, news organizations rely heavily on each other's
judgments of newsworthiness.1 70 Expanding coverage of the theme is self-
reinforcing. As Fishman explains:
[W]hen a ... theme is beginning to spread through more and
more media organizations, the "reality" of the theme is
confirmed for the media organizations who first reported it.
They now see others using the same theme. Moreover, as the
theme persists, news organizations already using the theme
will not hesitate to report new instances .... Thus, each use
of the theme confirms and justifies its prior use.' 7'
Moreover, official and public reaction to the theme further confirms it
and generates additional stories. 72  Sources seeking to attract media
coverage frame the information they provide in terms of the theme.
73
Fishman's analysis of news themes describes a kind of frame cascade that
further helps to explain the persuasiveness and pervasiveness of news
media frames.
One reason for the news media's adoption of the plaintiffs' framing of
clergy sexual abuse is that filing of numerous claims against the Church
created a sustained and familiar news theme. Filing multiple claims
simultaneously or aggregating many claims in class action or government
entity litigation has become an increasingly common strategy among tort
plaintiffs that increases pressure on defendants to settle. 74 This increases
the magnitude of the alleged wrongdoing and harm, as well as the litigation
itself, and it frames individual claims as part of a larger trend, which
provides a news theme. As the news theme cascades among news
organizations and grows, it often leads the media to portray the claims as
part of a larger crisis.
As originally reported by Yeoman, the Gauthe litigation was framed as
part of a larger news theme of child sexual abuse in general. The multiple
69 GITLIN, supra note 31, at 100; Fishman, supra note 168, at 106.
170 Fishman, supra note 168, at 106 (discussing the interrelation between local, regional, and
national coverage of the Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases).
17' Id. at 107. Fishman illustrates this point by showing how the proliferation of themes accounts
for the creation of crime waves by the media even when the crime rate is declining.
112Id. at I11.
173 Id.
174 RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (forthcoming 2007).
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claims filed against the Church by Gauthe's victims and his subsequent
criminal indictment, however, generated enough stories to make the
Gauthe litigation a news theme in its own right. As Berry and others
uncovered and reported other clergy abuse litigation around the country,
the theme became clergy sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. As we have
seen, these initial news frames cascaded throughout the media, and media
coverage encouraged more victims to come forward and file suit, in turn
generating more media coverage. In June of 1985, the National Catholic
Reporter called clergy sexual abuse a national "crisis" in the Catholic
Church. In 1991, Time Magazine referred to it as "[w]ithout doubt.., the
worst wave of moral scandals ever to beset Roman Catholicism in North
America,' 1 75 and by 2002 the press was regularly characterizing it as what
"may be the greatest scandal in the history of religion in America and
perhaps the most serious crisis Catholicism has faced since the
Reformation.'
176
It is significant that the rate of sexual abuse by Catholic clergy rose in
the 1950s and 1960s, peaked in the 1970s, and began a steady decline
starting in the mid-1980s, all before the scandal broke publicly.' 77 It was
thus the commencement and growth of litigation, not any rise in the rate of
clergy sexual abuse that supported the news theme of a crisis in the
Church. 1
78
D. EXPLAINING THE DOMINANCE OF PLAINTIFFS' FRAMING OF CLERGY
SEXUAL ABUSE
So far in this Part, I have argued that tort litigation provided a venue
for plaintiffs' framing of clergy sexual abuse as an issue of institutional
failure and that this became the dominant frame for news media coverage.
The dominance of plaintiffs' framing of the issue, however, was by no
means inevitable. Beginning with the Gauthe litigation, defense lawyers,
Church officials, and commentators constructed and promoted alternative
frames. I will canvas some of the most prominent contenders and then
suggest why the plaintiffs' frame ultimately prevailed.
In pleadings, at trial, and in statements to the press, defense counsel in
the Gauthe case Bob Wright, suggested that the Gastal parents were partly
responsible for the damage suffered by their son by subjecting him to a
175 Ostling, supra note 127, at 51.
176 Ostling, supra note 3 (internal quotation omitted).
177 KAREN TERRY & MARGARET LELAND SMITH, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF
MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
ANALYSIS 4 (2006), available at http//www.usccb.org/ocyp/JohnJayReport.pdf.
178 See PETER STEINFELS, A PEOPLE ADRIFT: THE CRISIS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
AMERICA 44-45, 53-54 (2003).
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public trial.' 79 In a statement to the press during the trial, Wright said that
"[t]he boy's psychologist ... advised the Gastal family not to bring the
matter to trial. He told the Gastals that publicity would only make their
son's condition worse. We contend that exposing the matter in a trial has
interfered with his chances of recovery."' 80  Wright and the plaintiffs'
original attorneys-Bencomo and Hebert-insisted that secret settlements
were necessary to protect the privacy of the victims.' 8' Wright also told
the press that the Gastal parents sought an excessive recovery, implying
that they were using the litigation for financial gain. 8 2 Speaking generally
of the phenomenon of clergy sex abuse litigation against the Church,
scholarly commentator Philip Jenkins asserts that high damage awards are
a primary motivation for pursuing the litigation. "[T]he potentially
lucrative rewards of church litigation," he writes, "are an obvious
temptation."' 8 3 According to this frame, the litigation process itself is a
form of child exploitation.
A related defense frame offered by the Church is that parents have
been contributorily negligent in allowing their children to spend so much
time in the unsupervised care of a priest, especially where there might have
been indications of excessive interest on the part of the priest or unusual
behavior on the part of the victim. Defense lawyers and Church officials
are somewhat reticent to promote this frame as it implies common
knowledge of clergy sexual abuse-and therefore toleration of it by
Church officials-and it smacks of blaming the victim.1
84
Defenders of the Church also frequently blame the legal system for
exacerbating the crisis. Church officials dealing with abuse allegations in
the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, on this account, did the best they could with the
resources available at the time. They relied on what we now know to be
erroneous advice that the best response to child abuse is confidentiality to
protect victims and psychotherapy to rehabilitate offenders. "Some of the
mistakes that bishops made," asserts Patrick Schiltz, "would have been
made by just about any of us at that time. Those mistakes did not reflect
bad faith, but an honest misunderstanding of the nature of sexual abuse and
the impact on its victims-an honest misunderstanding shared by most
179 Supplemental and Amending Answer 1.7, Gastal v. Hannan, No. 84-48175-A (La. 15th Dist.
Dec. 13, 1985) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); SIMON, supra note 16, at 149; David Milner,
Testimony Begins in Suit Against Diocese, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADvOC., Feb. 5, 1986, at 2B,
available at 1986 WL 4425600.
'so Milner, supra note 179.
181 Berry, Tragedy Part 11, supra note 164, at 27; Associated Press, supra note 140; UPI, Lawyer
Wants Bishop to List Likely Victims, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOC., Jan. 30, 1985, at 10B,
available at 1985 WL 4057212.
182 Milner, supra note 179.
183 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 130; see also id. at 125-32.
184 Telephone interview with Bob Wright, Church defense counsel in the Gauthe case, Albany,
NY (May 25, 2005) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); see also Boston Globe, supra note 167.
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Americans at the time."' 85 Between 1992 and 2002, according to Schiltz,
the Church could have preempted the post-2002 storm of litigation by
admitting its mistakes, holding accountable the priests who committed
abuse and the officials who facilitated it, and compensating victims.' 86 The
Church failed to do this, asserts Schiltz, because diocesan attorneys and
insurance company lawyers took an adversarial approach to the problem
and advised Bishops to share no information, make no apologies, offer no
assistance to victims, and impose no punishments on abusers since any of
these actions could be construed as an admission of wrongdoing and could
be used by plaintiffs to support their legal claims. 187  The post-2002
litigation boom has also been fueled, continues Schiltz, by plaintiffs'
attorneys seeking to profit from clergy sexual abuse who discourage any
contact between victims and the Church that might lead to reconciliation
and who encourage victims to inflate the extent of their injuries. 188
Since the very beginning of the litigation, the Church has sought to
portray itself as a victim of abusive priests who concealed their crimes
from diocesan officials. In a deposition statement widely reported in the
press, Lafayette's Bishop Frey referred to Gauthe in the following terms: "I
think you have to understand the man we're talking about .... He's a
very, very unique person. He's got a sort of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
personality, where he can fool people very easily. And he certainly
deceived me."'' 89 In 1997, twelve years later, Church officials were quoted
as insisting "they lacked knowledge about pedophiles' incurability until the
early 1990s and now are moving to flush out 'wolves in sheep's
clothing. ""90
Church officials have also sought to downplay the magnitude of the
problem. In the wake of revelations concerning Porter, Cardinal Law
suggested that priests who sexually abuse children are "the rare
exception."' 9' Former Boston Mayor and U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican,
Ray Flynn, began a 2002 interview on Nightline by suggesting, "Let's not
185 Patrick Schiltz, Speech at the University of Dayton School of Law, Too Much Law, Too Little
Justice: How Lawyers Helped to Turn a Clergy Sexual Abuse Problem Into a Clergy Sexual Abuse
Crisis 3 (Jan. 10, 2005) (transcript on file with Connecticut Law Review). For a similar analysis, see
Eugene Cullen Kennedy, About Those Priests, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2005, at C23, available at LEXIS,
News Library, CHTRIB file.
186 Schiltz, supra note 185.
17 Id. at 1-2, 6.
188 Patrick J. Schiltz, Defending the Church, 29 LrrIG. 19, 21, 25 (2003).
189 Barry Yeoman, How Much Did the Church Know?, TIMES OF ACADIANA, Feb. 7, 1985. This
quote was repeated in other news articles. See, e.g., Blow, supra note 81.
190 Brooks Egerton, Documents Show Bishops Transferred Known Abuser; Church Officials Say
Policies Have Since Changed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, DALNWS file.
'9' Kay Longcope, Sexual Abuse by Priests is a "Betrayal, " "Rare," Law Says, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 14, 1992, at 29, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
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just try to bring down the Catholic church here because of a handful of bad
apples in the barrel.' 92
The Church and its defenders have also sought to portray the Church
as a victim of an anti-Catholic press. In 1985, the Daily Advertiser of
Lafayette criticized the Times of Acadiana coverage in a stinging editorial,
proclaiming that "[i]t's time to call a halt to the exploitation of the Gilbert
Gauthe affair," and asking rhetorically,
Now will those who thrive on the misery of others permit
the matter to rest, content to let the judicial system work or
will they turn it all into some extravaganza exploiting
pornography while condemning the Catholic Church and all
the priests who serve it? Will the vultures of yellow
journalism and sadistic movie making creeps attempt to
convert the sexual aberrations of one man to best selling porn
status on the bookshelf and another mini-series that violates
mankind's universal code of decency?
93
The editorial went on to insist that "[t]he Catholic Church is not on
trial in the Gauthe affair," and it ended with a call to forgive "any
unscrupulous individuals who for one reason or another attempt to blacken
the reputation of our entire religious community.' ' 194 Similar sentiments
were expressed at a 1992 meeting of 500 Boston area priests who met to
discuss reforms proposed by the Boston archdiocese. One priest reportedly
said that press coverage of clergy sex abuse was "just like in Germany
when the Nazis crushed the church."'195 Also in 1992, Cardinal Law
himself issued an angry denunciation of press coverage of the Porter affair.
"'The good and dedicated people who serve the church deserve better than
what they have been getting day in and day out in the media,' Law
declared.... 'By all means, we call down God's power on the media,
particularly the Globe! ,,196 Jenkins alleges that the press unfairly singled
out the Catholic Church in its coverage of clergy sexual abuse, and that
press framing and rhetoric grow out of a tradition of centuries-old anti-
Catholic polemic. 197 One-time religion correspondent for the New York
Times, Peter Steinfels, laments "just how antagonistic to Catholicism the
media culture has become."'
198
192 Nightline: Sins of the Fathers; Catholic Church Deals, supra note 106.
'9' Editorial, The Catholic Church is Not on Trial!, DAILY ADVERTISER, June 16, 1985.
194 Id
195 James L. Franklin, Catholics Struggle with Delay, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1992, at 1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File. For a similar sentiment expressed by a Honduran
cardinal, see STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 63.
196 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 213.
197 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 19, 24-25, 32.
'9' STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 65. For other examples of this frame, see L. Martin Nussbaum,
Changing the Rules: Selective Justice for Catholic Institutions, AM., May 15, 2006, 13, 13 (alleging
that press coverage has created the false impression that child sexual abuse is a Catholic problem);
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Defenders of the Church have combined efforts to minimize the
problem with claims of anti-Catholic bias by characterizing the incidence
of clergy sexual abuse within the Church as low compared to the incidence
of child sexual abuse in other social institutions. In a 2006 advertisement
on the editorial page of the New York Times, Catholic League President
William Donohue, citing data that there were only nine credible sexual
abuse allegations against Catholic priests in 2005--".02 percent of
priests"-argued:
It is highly unlikely that there are many institutions or
demographic groups with a better record than this (e.g., it is
estimated that the rate of sexual abuse of public school
students is more than 100 times the abuse by priests).
Obviously, one victim is too many. But when 99.98 percent
of priests today are not under suspicion-and indeed most are
good men-it is outrageous that they continue to be subjected
to vile depictions in the media, sneering remarks by educators
and inequitable treatment by lawmakers. Stereotypes do not
die easily, but it is high time our cultural elite began to treat
priests with the degree of respect they've earned. Sweeping
condemnations of any group is rightly regarded as bigotry.
Including Catholic priests. 199
On this account, the Catholic Church is in fact a leader in addressing the
problem of child sexual abuse and a victim of widespread anti-Catholic
bias.
Individuals on both sides of the issue have attempted to place blame
for clergy sexual abuse of children on homosexuality among priests.
Plaintiffs' attorney in the Gauthe case, Minos Simon, believed that
pedophilia was "a species of homosexuality" and that "homosexuality per
se was a risk-producing activity. 2 00 Based on these beliefs, he argued that
"knowledge on the part of church officials concerning the existence of
homosexual activity would result in a duty on the part of the church
officials to take affirmative steps to protect altar boys from homosexual
priests."20' The relationship between homosexuality and pedophilia in the
Gauthe case was analyzed and debated in early media coverage of the
202litigation. Berry suggested that hypocritical tolerance of homosexual
Nightline: Sins of the Fathers; Catholic Church Deals, supra note 106 (Ray Flynn suggests that press
attention to clergy sexual abuse in the Boston archdiocese is disproportionate).
19 Scandal in the Church: Four Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A23, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
200 SIMON, supra note 16, at 146.
2o Id. at 147.
202 Blow, supra note 81; Associated Press, supra note 140.
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activity among priests within the Church contributed to a clerical culture
that turned a blind eye toward other forms of sexual activity also forbidden
by Church doctrine. °3 American Bishops and Vatican officials also sought
to frame clergy sexual abuse as a result of accepting homosexuals within
the priesthood.2°  In response to the scandal in late 2005, the Vatican
issued a new policy banning candidates for the priesthood "who are
actively homosexual, have deep-seated homosexual tendencies, or support
the so-called 'gay culture.'
20 5
Church officials have also sought to frame clergy sex abuse as a matter
of sin, a moral failing that is best addressed by Church doctrines of
repentance and forgiveness, rather than as a crime or a civil wrong to be
turned over to the secular justice system.2 In explaining why he failed to
check on Gauthe's behavior as a parish priest, even after he knew of
Gauthe's sexual misconduct with children at a previous parish, diocesan
official Monsignor Richard Mouton explained: "I am trained to forget
people's sins, as a priest. ' 20 7 As Cardinal Law explained in a 1992 Boston
Globe article, "we live out our life as a community of faith, very much like
a family .... My hope is that we can evolve a policy that can effectively
deal with the issue without gearing it into a legal mode. 20 8
Commentators have attempted to downplay the scandal by drawing a
distinction between sexual molestation of prepubescent children-
"pedophilia"-and postpubescent adolescent children-"ephebophilia"-
noting that cases of the former are relatively rare among reported cases of
clergy sexual abuse, while the latter are more common.20 9  Framing the
abuse of prepubescent children as a distinct phenomenon from that of
adolescents allows them to portray pedophilia as a relatively minor
problem within the Church and divert attention to sexual relations between
203 See BERRY, supra note 1, at 243-44; see also JENKINS, supra note 6, at 103-04.
204 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 357. This stance has sparked debate within the Church. The Los
Angeles Times Poll quoted one priest as saying in response: "The bishops not only perpetuated harm
upon those sexually abused, but now they put at social, spiritual, and physical risk those of a different
sexual orientation. Shame!" L.A. TIMES POLL, A SURVEY OF ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO 3 (2002), available at http://www.latimesinteractive.com/
pdfarchive/speciallla-timespollpriests-471 book.pdf.
205 Ian Fisher & Laurie Goodstein, In Strong Terms, Rome is to Ban Gays as Priests, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2005, A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
206 See Balboni, supra note 158, at ch. 5.
207 Pope, supra note 77.
208 Franklin, supra note 195. Jenkins suggests that the rejection of sin as a frame for clergy sexual
abuse reflects a more general trend of rejecting religious authority and outlook in favor of secular ideas
and state power: "Whereas once the religious institutions would have been thought worthy of enforcing
internal standards of behavior and morality, the current trend is to seek external controls from civil and
criminal law, and to impose the value systems of nonreligious groups." JENKINS, supra note 6, at 161-
62.
209 See, e.g., JENKINS supra note 6, at 79. On the distinction, see L. M. Lothstein, Psychological
Theories of Pedophilia and Ephebophilia, in SLAYER OF THE SOUL: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 20-21 (Stephen Rossetti ed., 1990); Stephen Rossetti & L. M. Lothstein, Myths of
the Child Molester, in SLAYER OF THE SOUL, supra, at 14.
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clergy and postpubescent adolescents, which are considered less
scandalous. Relying on this distinction, Jenkins suggests that:
In the prevailing psychiatric opinion of the 1970s and
early 1980s, it would have been quite appropriate to return to
a parish setting a man who had been successfully treated for
ephebophilia but not for pedophilia, and it was precisely this
issue of the employment of past offenders that led to such
scandal following the Gauthe case. 210
He goes on to quote a Canadian bishop who framed a clergy sex abuse
scandal in Nova Scotia in the following terms: "We are not dealing with
classic pedophilia. I do not want to argue that homosexual activity
between a priest and an adolescent is therefore moral. Rather it does not
have the horrific character of pedophilia." 21" Jenkins, himself, concludes:
Suggesting that the church concealed or tolerated
pedophiles is much more destructive than the charge that it
granted a certain degree of tolerance to priests involved in
consensual relationships with older boys or young men. In
Catholic church law, the age of heterosexual consent is
sixteen rather than the eighteen common to most American
jurisdictions.2 12
As these alternative frames suggest, there has been a great deal of
frame competition over how to characterize clergy sex abuse. One could
plausibly frame it as a matter of parental exploitation of abused children,
victimization of the Church by a small number of deceitful priests, anti-
Catholic secular media coverage, homosexuality in the priesthood, the
appropriateness of treating child sexual abuse as a sin rather than a crime
or a tort, or largely an issue of consensual sexual relations between priests
and adolescent boys and young men.213 The dominant news media frame,
however, is clearly that of plaintiffs who portray the issue as one of
institutional failure and episcopal responsibility.
210 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 79.
211 Id.
212 Id. For a similar apologetic sentiment, see John S. Baker, Jr., Prosecuting Dioceses and
Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1061, 1084 (2003).
213 These examples do not exhaust the frames presented in debates over clergy sex abuse.
Common frames within the church include reformers' frames of celibacy requirements as a cause of
clerical sexual abuse, lack of democracy and transparency in church governance as a cause of the
institutional failure of the Bishops, and conservatives' frame of a breakdown in sexual doctrines and
priestly discipline. For the reform view, see JIMMY BRESLIN, THE CHURCH THAT FORGOT CHRIST
(2004); PAUL R. DOKECKI, THE CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CRISIS: REFORM AND RENEWAL IN THE
CATHOLIC COMMUNITY (2004). For the conservative view, see SHAKEN BY SCANDALS: CATHOLICS
SPEAK OUT ABOUT PRIESTS' SEXUAL ABUSE (Paul Thigpen ed., 2002).
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As we have seen, there are four reasons that explain the news media's
adoption of plaintiffs' framing of clergy sexual abuse as an issue of
institutional failure. First, the plaintiffs' complaint in the Gauthe case
offered the kind of frame appealing to most news audiences: a narrative
drama with a clear moral lesson involving personal conflict between
innocent children, a compulsive pedophile, and allegedly uncaring elites in
positions of power. Against the background of widespread news reports in
the early 1980s of ritual child sexual abuse among daycare workers, this
plaintiffs' frame offered a culturally familiar story with a novel clerical
element. The Gauthe case's dramatic narrative provided a template for
subsequent litigation over the next twenty years, enhancing the cultural
familiarity of the frame over time.214
Second, the media's desire for credible sources led it to rely heavily on
litigation documents, which it viewed as providing, in the words of John
Pope, "the kind of information you feel you can take to the bank."2 5 The
media supplemented these documentary sources with interviews, mostly of
plaintiffs' attorneys-like J. Minos Simon-acting as parajoumalists and
eventually of reporters themselves-like Jason Berry-presented as
experts.
Third, a steady flow of litigation events provided news pegs and
facilitated continuous episodic coverage of the story. The protracted
drama of the litigation itself attracted attention, as illustrated by such news
items as the side-by-side photos and quotes of attorneys Simon and
Mouton in the Gauthe case.
Fourth, the continuous supply and growing volume of litigation
provided the basis for a news theme, portrayed eventually as a "crisis" in
the Church. True to the dynamics of news themes, this "crisis" grew in
magnitude and significance as time went on, becoming an increasingly
salient theme for news editors. At the outset of the litigation, in the mid-
1980s, there was considerable ambivalence, and in some cases resistance,
to this frame among editors.21 6 Nevertheless, the initial newsworthiness of
the story and eventual momentum of the theme as it cascaded through the
media overcame most of this reticence, until the media gave the plaintiffs'
litigation frame of institutional failure a place of clear predominance.
III. TORT LITIGATION & POLICY RESPONSES TO CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE
Having argued that tort litigation led the news media to report clergy
sexual abuse and to frame it as an issue of institutional failure, I now show
that litigation placed clergy sexual abuse on the policy agendas of the
Catholic Church, law enforcement, and state legislatures, and shaped
214 See KITZINGER, supra note 124, at 54-55, 74.
215 Pope Interview, supra note 138.
216 See BERRY, supra note 1, at 237; Editorial, supra note 193.
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policy responses to the problem. Once publicized, litigation and the news
coverage it generated raised concern about the issue among large segments
of the general public and the Catholic laity. Litigation and news coverage
also mobilized elites: they enabled victims, lawyers, and activists to join
forces in advocating for policy reforms. As we shall see, the pressure
exerted by all of these groups increased over time. By 2002, the efforts to
address clergy sexual abuse consumed the American Bishops, became an
area of major concern among law enforcement, and were taken up by state
legislatures around the country. Moreover, so powerful was the frame of
institutional failure-created by plaintiffs and adopted by the news
media-that policy debate focused almost entirely on institutional
reform.217
A. Agenda Access
Policy debate can be viewed as essentially a contest of frames. In
analyzing the competition between frames within the policymaking
process, scholars have developed the idea of an agenda. Public policy
scholars Roger Cobb and Charles Elder distinguish between two distinct
but related types of agendas. The first type is public agendas, consisting of
"issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political
community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the
legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority. 218 The relevant
political community can be either all members of a polity or some political
subdivision. The second type of agenda is institutional agendas, consisting
of "that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of
authoritative decisionmakers." 219 In analyzing the impact of clergy sexual
abuse, I distinguish between the public agendas of the general public and
the Catholic laity and the institutional agendas of Church officials, law
enforcement, and state legislatures.
1. Expansion of the Issue to Larger Publics
The presence of an issue on a public agenda may create pressure to
place that issue on an institutional agenda. Put more simply, public
pressure may attract the attention of policymakers and spur them into
action. Thus, "the expansion of issues to larger publics acts as a prelude to
formal agenda consideration., 220 The key to attracting public attention is
217 My account of the mobilization, agenda-setting, and framing effects of litigation owes much to
Lynn Mather's trail-breaking study of tobacco litigation. See Mather, supra note 5, at 912-25.
218 ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
DYNAMICS OF AGENDA BUILDING 85 (1972); see also JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES,
AND PUBLIC POLICIES 3-4 (1984).
219 COBB & ELDER, supra note 218, at 86; KINGDON, supra note 218, at 3-4.
220 COBB & ELDER, supra note 218, at 160.
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persuasive framing. Public policy scholars have identified a number of
features that make issue frames persuasive to larger publics. Elaine Sharp
suggests that frames are more likely to attract public attention when they
have a dramatic character, personal relevance, and elements of novelty.22'
Sharp explains widespread public concern with drug abuse based on the
use of dramatic stories of personal tragedy used to frame the issue,
widespread personal experience with the negative social consequences of
drug abuse, and the periodic appearance of new drugs. Ellen Frankel Paul
observes that framing issues in the context of dramatic, catastrophic events
increases their salience, and public attention to them can be sustained by
subsequent recurrent events of a similar nature.222 National concern with
hurricane response in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and
subsequent hurricanes in Houston and Florida offers a recent example.223
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones point out that framing issues in
relation to other currently salient issues also attracts attention.224 For
example, framing airline regulation in terms of safety may make it more
salient if transportation safety is already on the public agenda. All of these
findings complement the frame analysis of litigation and news production
suggesting that dramatic narratives with momentous events and familiar
themes enhance the persuasiveness of frames. That is, the same features
that make frames persuasive to judges and juries and appealing to
journalists also attract the attention of larger publics.
a. General Public
In examining general public awareness of and concern about clergy
sexual abuse, I turn first to survey data, the most direct measure.
Unfortunately, there is no relevant survey data prior to 2002. In order to
supplement the survey data, I look at the venues and volume of media
coverage of the issue over a longer period-between 1984 and 2004. While
not a direct measure of public awareness, the venues and volume of media
coverage during this period indicate the public's exposure to the issue,
which may be viewed as a "surrogate indicator of what issues the public is
likely to believe are important., 225 I look also at the volume of letters to
221 Elaine B. Sharp, Paradoxes of National Antidrug Policymaking, in THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM
DEFINITION: SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA 98, 103-05 (David A. Rochefort & Roger W. Cobb eds.,
1994).
222 Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment: A Defining Moment and Its Repercussions, in THE
POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION, supra note 221, at 67, 94; see also THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER
DISASTER: AGENDA SETING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS 3 (1997); KINGDON, supra note
218, at 99-100.
223 See BIRKLAND, supra note 222, at 47 (discussing how natural disasters serve as focusing
events).
224 Frank K Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones, Attention, Boundary Effects, and Large-Scale Policy
Change in Air Transportation Policy, in THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION, supra note 221, at 50,
53.
225 John Bohte et al., One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court's Influence on Attentiveness to
Issues in the United States, 1947-1992, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE
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the editor, which provides a more direct measure of public awareness and
concern but for which there is less data available. Aside from news
coverage, I also examine an online comprehensive bibliography of official,
professional, scholarly, and artistic materials on clergy sexual abuse.
i. Survey Data
Five surveys conducted in 2002 suggest a high level of public
awareness of and concern about clergy sexual abuse. A February ABC
News poll of a random national sample of 1008 adults found that 60% of
them agreed with the characterization of clergy sexual abuse as "a major
problem that requires immediate attention," 26% viewed it as a "less
immediate problem," 12% saw it as "not much of a problem at all," and
226
only 3% had no opinion. In a subsequent March Washington
Post/ABC/Beliefnet poll of a random sample of 1086 adults found that
those viewing it as a "major problem" had risen to 76%, with 16%
characterizing it as a "less immediate problem," 6% "not much of a
problem at all," and only 2% had no opinion. Eighty percent of
respondents in this poll characterized the issue as a "crisis" for the
Church.227 A June Washington Post poll of a national random sample of
1004 adults asked respondents whether they approved or disapproved of
"the way the Catholic Church has handled the issue of sexual abuse of
children by priests" and found that 77% disapproved, 19% approved, and
4% had no opinion. 228 A May New York Times/CBS News poll of a
random national sample of 1172 adults asked: "How closely have you been
following the news about the recent charges against Catholic priests
involving sexual abuse of children and teenagers?" Twenty-eight percent
responded "very", 41% "somewhat", 21% "not very", 9% "not at all," 0%
"no opinion., 229  Finally, Associated Press readers selected the clergy
abuse scandal as the third most important news story of 2002.23°
Together these five polls suggest a high degree of public awareness,
with between 96% and 100% offering some opinion on the matter. They
SOCIAL CHANGE 23-24 (David Schultz ed., 1998); see also SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER,
NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION 16 (1987).
226 Gary Langer, ABCNews.com, Not Doing Enough Poll: Many Americans Concerned About
Sex Abuse by Priests, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/-us/DailyNews/churchsex
_pol102022l.html. Full data is available at Post/ABC/Beliefnet Poll: The Catholic Church, Apr. 4,
2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/dataO4O42.htm [hereinafter
Apr. 4, 2002 Poll].
227 Apr. 4,2002 Poll, supra note 226.
228 WashingtonPost.com, Washington Post Poll: The Catholic Church, June 18, 2002,
http://www.washintonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data06l802.htm [hereinafter June 18,
2002 Poll].
229 New York Times/CBS News Poll, Apr. 28-May 1, 2002 (on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
230 DOKECKI, supra note 213, at 1.
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also suggest a relatively high level of concern about the issue, with
between 60% and 76% characterizing it as a "major problem that demands
immediate attention," and 80% calling it a "crisis.,' 23' Recall that 2002 was
the year that litigation documents in the Geoghan case were unsealed and
widely reported in the media, abuse allegations skyrocketed, and the
volume of litigation exploded from Boston to Los Angeles. Unfortunately,
poll data can tell us nothing about the levels of general public awareness
and concern prior to 2002. For this, we will have to rely on the venues and
volume of press coverage, for which there is data available back to the
initial coverage of the Gauthe litigation.
ii. Media Coverage
The venues and volume of press coverage may be used to gauge the
level of public awareness and concern about an issue. Media scholars
Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, based on studies of television
coverage, have shown that "those problems that receive prominent
attention on the national news become the roblems the viewing public
regards as the nation's most important. 232 Political scientists Roy
Flemming, John Bohte, and Dan Wood point out that "[r]elations between
the media and the public are obviously reciprocal in nature. The media
faces market incentives to follow events and develop stories that attract
audiences. At the same time, public concerns over issues reflect in part the
media's coverage.,' 233 Regardless of the direction of influence, however,
media coverage-which can be measured by the placement, or venue, of
stories and the volume of stories-offers a proxy for public awareness and
concern.
Consider first the venues in which stories about clergy sexual abuse
appeared. As we have seen, the Gauthe litigation generated stories in
national news venues such as the New York Times, the Washington Post,
Time Magazine, the AP and UPI wire services. It was also the basis for an
episode of the CBS news magazine West 57th, and it inspired the 1990
Home Box Office movie Judgment. The Porter case also attracted
significant national media attention in 1992 and 1993, including stories in
the New York Times, Newsweek, and People; segments on Prime Time Live
and 60 Minutes; and episodes of Geraldo, Oprah Winfrey, Phil Donahue,
and Sally Jessy Raphael.2 34 Between 1992 and 1994, stories on clergy
abuse were also published or broadcast in Time, The Nation, the New
Yorker, the National Review, Ms. Magazine, Redbook, McCall's, Playboy,
231 See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
232 IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 225, at 16-33.
233 Roy Flemming et al., One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court's Influence on
Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947-1992, in LEVERAGING THE LAW, supra note 225, at
21, 23.
234 BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at 14-15.
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Rolling Stone, ABC's Primetime Live, Dateline NBC, CNN Reports, Arts
and Entertainment Network's Investigative Reports, and Court
Television.235 Another surge of media occurred at the time of the Geoghan
case in Boston, generating thousands of newspaper articles in 2002 and
placing the issue on the covers of Newsweek, Time, and US. News and
World Report, "a journalistic trifecta usually reserved for war, politics,
plane crashes and colossal natural disasters." 23
6
A sense of the volume of press coverage can be obtained by tracking
newspaper and magazine coverage for each of the years from 1984 to
2004. Table 1 (found in Appendix 1) presents the number of stories
published in thirteen major newspapers and nine popular magazines each
year during this period. These news outlets all have relatively large
audiences and are available on the LexisNexis and Westlaw databases back
to 1984 or 1985. For almost all of these news outlets, there is a sharp
increase in the number of stories in 1992 and again in 2002. During the
peak years of 1993 and 2002, press coverage was relatively heavy in
several of the news outlets examined. For example, in 1993, the New York
Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, and St. Louis
Post Dispatch each ran between forty and eighty-six articles. The Chicago
Tribune in that year ran 111 stories. These numbers are even more
dramatic in 2002, when they each ran between 337 and 773 articles. The
heavy volume of news stories continued in 2003 and 2004.
Beyond media exposure, another measure of public awareness and
concern is letters to the editor. Table 2 (found in Appendix 2) presents the
number of letters to the editor concerning clergy sexual abuse in these
same publications and period as Table 1.238 Again, one finds sudden
increases in 1992 and 2002, although they are less dramatic than increases
in the volume of news stories in most cases. The volume of letters in 2002
is especially notable: the New York Times (89), Boston Globe (75), Los
Angeles Times (42), St. Louis Post Dispatch (60), and the Chicago Tribune
(38).
The increases in media attention during 1992-1993 and 2002-2004
coincide with the Porter and Geoghan cases respectively. It is, however,
doubtful that the shape of the curve is due to the absence of litigation in the
periods between the Gauthe and Porter cases (1985-1991) and between the
Porter and Geoghan cases (1994-2001). Indeed, there were two landmark
235 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 74.
236 STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 40 (estimating 12,000 articles in major newspapers, television
networks, cable outlets, wire services, and newsmagazines).
237 Table I can be found at the end of this Article in Appendix I on page 881 along with an
explanation of methodology.
238 Table 2 can be found at the end of this Article in Appendix 2 on page 885 along with an
explanation of methodology.
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verdicts against dioceses in 1989 and 1998.239 Anecdotal evidence from
interviews with attorneys, Church officials, and victim advocates suggests
that the media attention focused on the Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases
sparked increases in claims against dioceses and that there was active
litigation in the periods between the Gauthe and Porter cases and the Porter
and Geoghan cases.24 0
One possible explanation for the spikes in media coverage that
coincide with the Porter and Geoghan cases is that these cases provided
what policy scholars call focusing events.24' Thomas Birkland defines
focusing events as sudden, rare events that affect a relatively large number
of people and thereby attract media coverage and capture the attention of
larger publics and policymakers.242 Typical examples include natural
disasters or political crises. Focusing events influence policy agendas by
expanding awareness of issues to larger publics and by spurring the
mobilization of groups seeking policy change. The Gauthe, Porter, and
Geoghan cases served as focusing events: they suddenly exposed what
were thought to be rare instances of clergy sexual abuse involving large
numbers of victims. The Porter and Geoghan cases each reportedly
involved over 200 victims and gave rise to dozens of lawsuits.243 As we
have seen in this section and will see in the next, news coverage of these
two cases expanded the issue to both the general public and the Catholic
laity. And, as we shall see, they facilitated the mobilization of victims,
lawyers, and activists seeking policy change.
In addition to the influence of the Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases
in increasing news media coverage, there are other factors that tended to
dampen news media coverage in the periods in between. In the 1985-1991
period, most claims were settled quietly with confidentiality agreements
that bound the parties to secrecy, and case files were commonly sealed by
trial judges. 244 The drop in coverage between 1994-2002 was due not only
239 In the 1989 case of Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis and Diocese of
Winona, a jury found Church defendants liable for willful indifference and awarded a plaintiff
$821,250 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages-the first punitive damages
award against the Church in a clergy sexual abuse case. The punitive damage award was reduced by
the trial judge to $187,000. See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1389
(8th Cir. 1986). In the 1989 case John Doe I v. Rudolph Kos, a jury awarded plaintiffs a record $119.6
million verdict, $101 million in compensation and $18.6 million in punitive damages. The Church
appealed the verdict, and the plaintiffs eventually settled for $31 million. See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF
THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 43.
240 Clohessy Interview, supra note 17; Interview with Bishop Howard Hubbard, in Albany, NY, at
3 (Mar. 29, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); Rubino Interview, supra note 17; Demarest
Interview, supra note 23, at 6.
241 KINGDON, supra note 218, at 99-101.
242 BIRKLAND, supra note 222, at 22-27.
243 BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at 24 (estimating Porter's victims at more than 200);
INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at photo following p. 114 (estimating
Geoghan's victims at 200); Rezendes, supra note 149, at 4 (filing of claims against Geoghan sparked
the Globe's coverage).24 Rubino Interview, supra note 17.
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to the continuing use of confidentiality agreements and the sealing of court
files but also to media reticence to cover the story in the wake of widely
publicized allegations against Chicago's Cardinal Bernadin that were
subsequently withdrawn.245 Peaks in media coverage coinciding with the
Porter and Geoghan cases are highlighted in Chart 1 (found in Appendix
4), which graphs the annual number of articles and letters in all of the
publications surveyed.246
In addition to media coverage, an online bibliography of clergy sexual
abuse lists, as of June 2005, 1430 books, chapters, magazine articles,
scholarly monographs, theses, official reports, videos, audiotapes, novels,
poems, and works of art, and dozens of new entries are added every six
months.247
b. Catholic Laity
Evidence that clergy sexual abuse features prominently on the agenda
of lay Catholics can similarly be found in survey data and media coverage.
Concern among lay Catholics was a significant source of pressure on
Church officials to take up the problem of clergy sexual abuse. As
USCCB General Counsel Mark Chopko explains, the key to understanding
the Gauthe case's impact was:
the energy that it gave to the people in the pews .... [I]t's
not a problem for bishops if the New York Times gets excited
about it. It's a real problem for bishops to know that their
people are outraged by it, and both of these things were
happening at the same time.248
i. Survey Data
Survey data show that clergy sexual abuse has been a major concern
among the Catholic laity since the Porter case. A 1992 Boston Globe poll
of 401 self-identified Massachusetts Catholics found that 96% said that
"they were aware of recent news stories about 'inappropriate sexual
contact' between priests and young people" and that 69% agreed with the
statement that "the church has not done enough to address these kinds of
245 On the use of confidentiality agreements and sealing of court files, see INVESTIGATIVE STAFF
OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at ix, 47-50. On the affect of the allegations against Cardinal
Bernadin on media coverage, see STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 60-61.
246 Chart 1 can be found at the end of this Article in Appendix 4 on page 894.
247 JAMES S. EVINGER, ADVOCATEWEB ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE
(9th rev. 2005), http://www.advocateweb.org/hope/bibliographyje/default.asp.
248 Telephone interview with Mark Chopko, General Counsel, U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, in Albany, NY (Mar. 22, 2006) (transcript on file with Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter
Chopko Interview].
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incidents., 249  A 1993 National Catholic Reporter/Gallup poll of 800
Catholics found that, according to 50% of respondents, reports of clergy
sexual abuse "weakened their faith and commitment" to the Church.250
The magazine Emerging Trends reported in 1993 that "[n]early half of
U.S. Catholics (48 percent) believe that sexual abuse of young people by
priests is a widespread problem," and that "[a] majority of 53 percent
believe the Catholic Church has done a bad job of dealing with the
problem, and 64 percent say it has been more concerned with protecting its
own image than with solving the problem."25'
Subsequent polls from 2002 also indicate concern among the laity. A
February ABC News poll of 232 Catholics from around the nation found
that 48% considered it a "major problem," 29% a "less immediate
problem," 21% "not much of a problem at all," and 2% had no opinion. 2
A follow-up Washington Post/ABC/Beliefnet poll of 503 Catholics from
around the nation found that 71% now considered it a "major problem,"
19% a "less immediate problem", 9% "not much of a problem at all," and
1% had no opinion.25 3 A February Boston Globe/WBZ-TV poll of 800
Boston archdiocese Catholics asked respondents "How closely have you
been following recent news stories detailing instances of sexual abuse of
children by priests?" 49% responded "very," 43% "somewhat," and 8%
"not."25 4  A May USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll of 256 Catholics from
around the nation found that 75% of respondents thought that the Catholic
Church has "done a bad job in dealing with the problem of sexual abuse
committed by its priests," 20% thought the Church was doing a good job,
and 5% had no opinion.255 A June Washington Post poll of 355 self-
identified Catholics from around the nation found that 70% disapproved of
"the way the Catholic Church has handled the issue of sexual abuse of
children by priests," 27% approved, and only 3% had no opinion.256
More recent surveys suggest that the Catholic laity remains concerned
about clergy sexual abuse. In a 2003 Boston Globe survey of 400 Boston
archdiocese Catholics, 41% said that they considered "addressing clergy
sexual abuse" to be "the most important problem facing the Boston
249 James Franklin, Mass. Catholics Fault Church on Handling of Sex Charges, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 26, 1992, at Metro 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
250 Jim Davidson, Generational Differences among Catholics Emerge, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 8,
1993, at 29.
251 Special Report: Catholicism in America at the Crossroads, 15 EMERGING TRENDS, Oct. 1993,
at 1,5.
252 Langer, supra note 226. Full data available at Apr. 4, 2002 Poll, supra note 226.
253 Apr. 4, 2002 Poll, supra note 226.
254 Michael Paulson, Most Catholics in Poll Fault Law's Performance, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8,
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
255 USATODAY.com, USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll, May 28-29, 2002, http://www.usa
today.com/news/nation/2002/06/03/catholic-poll-results.htm.
256 June 18, 2002 Poll, supra note 228.
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Catholic archdiocese today., 257  And finally, an April 2005 Quinnipiac
University poll of 500 Catholics from around the nation found that 86%
thought that "under the next Pope ... the Catholic Church [should] do
more to combat sexual abuse of young people by priests," while 11%
thought that the Church's "current position about right," and 4% had no
opinion or did not know.
258
This survey data suggests that, as early as 1992 among Massachusetts
Catholics, there was widespread awareness (96%) of the issue and concern
among the great majority (69%) that the Church was not doing enough.
National surveys in 1993 reflect serious concern about the problem among
roughly 50% of Catholics. Polls in 2002 show that by mid-year, an
overwhelming majority of Catholics nationwide considered the issue a
major problem, and that no more than 5% in any poll had no opinion on the
matter. Polls since 2002 consistently suggest ongoing concern about the
problem.
ii. Media Coverage
Aside from survey data, another indication that clergy sexual abuse
holds a prominent place on the agenda of the laity is the venues and
volume of coverage in the Catholic media. The issue has been covered in
such widely read Catholic and Christian periodicals as America,
Commonweal, U.S. Catholic, Church and State, Episcopal Life, and
Christian Century. The National Catholic Reporter, which, as we have
seen, began its coverage of the issue in 1985, has provided sustained
coverage since that time.259 A computer search for "clergy sex abuse" in
the weekly's online archives yielded 423 items in the twenty-two weeks
between February 6, 2004 and July 15, 2005-nineteen articles or
references to the topic per week.260 A similar search in the recent online
archives of the Catholic News Service, an independent division of the
USCCB used frequently as a news source by the approximately 170 U.S.
Catholic newspapers and broadcasters, yielded 297 news items in the
thirteen weeks between April 1 and July 29, 2005-an average of twenty-
257 KRC/Communications Research, Globe Poll Results, May 4-6, 2003, http://www.boston.com/
globe/spotlight/abuse/poll/Q5.htm.
25 Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, New Pope Must Do More to Curb Abuse by Priests,
U.S. Catholics Say 8-1, Apr. 14, 2005, available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/xi295.xml?Release
ID=675.
259 See JENKINS, supra note 6, at 103, 106, 116, 151 (commenting on coverage by the paper in the
years from the Gauthe to Porter cases).
210 1 conducted this search on August 5, 2005, requesting documents including all of the terms
"clergy," "sex," and "abuse" from the online index at http://www.picosearch.com/cgi-bin/ts.p (first
page of results on file with Connecticut Law Review).
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three items per week. 261  These two publications are among the most
prestigious and widely read Catholic news outlets, and although these
figures are far from comprehensive, they do provide evidence of heavy
recent exposure to the issue among the Catholic news media audience.
A sense of the volume of Catholic media coverage since 1984 can be
obtained by tracking the number of articles on clergy sex abuse listed in
the Catholic Periodical and Literature Index between 1983 and 2004.262
Sixty-four Catholic periodicals listed in the index published 1130 stories
on clergy sexual abuse during this period. The volume of stories increased
dramatically (125%) in 1993 to fifty-four stories and even more so
(2460%) in 2002 to 512 stories, with an additional increase (81%) in 1998
to forty-nine stories, rising to sixty-six stories (thirty-three of which were
published in the National Catholic Reporter) in 1999. These data are
presented in Table 3 (found in Appendix 3) and displayed graphically in
Chart 2 (found in Appendix 5).263 Again, two of the peaks in news volume
coincide with the Porter and Geoghan litigation. (The third peak coincides
with another well publicized case against Father Rudolf Kos and the Dallas
archdiocese in 1997).2 4
Evidence of not only exposure to, but also engagement with, the issue
of clergy sexual abuse among the laity may be gleaned from a search for
web pages on the Internet. A recent Google search for web pages
including the terms "sex" and "abuse" and either "church," "clergy," or
"priest" produced 3,250,000 web pages.265 The same search terms
produced a listing of 89,300 discussion groups (many with multiple
comments by multiple authors) in Google's online discussion group
service.26 6 This last figure includes only those online discussion groups
sponsored by Google, so the number of comments posted to online chat
sites is likely to be considerably larger. There have been several websites
dedicated entirely to clergy sexual abuse, providing news, analysis,
documents, and studies of the issue, such as bishop-accountability.org,
bishopswatch.org, and many others that offer extensive and sustained
coverage of the issue. These latter include websites of the Boston Globe
and the National Catholic Reporter, as well as beliefnet.com.
261 1 conducted this search on August 5, 2005, requesting documents including all of the terms
"clergy," "sexual," and "abuse" from the online index at http://search.atomz.com/search/?sp-i=l&sp-
q=clergy+sexual+abuse&sp-a=sp1001 892c&sp-s=l&sp-f=iso-8859-l.
262 For an explanation of methodology, see Appendix 3.
263 Table 3 can be found at the end of this Article in Appendix 3 on page 889, and Chart 2 can be
found in Appendix 5 on page 895.
264 See supra note 239.
265 Search conducted Aug. 5, 2005 (first page of search results on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
26 Search conducted Aug. 5, 2005 (first page of search results on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
[Vol. 39:809
CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE LITIGATION
c. Victims, Lawyers, and Activists
Victims, their lawyers, and activists make up a third significant public
that exerted pressure to put clergy sexual abuse on the institutional policy
agendas of Church and government officials. Litigation often has the
effect of mobilizing such groups. Lawsuits personalize and dramatize
social issues, and resulting press coverage disseminates information about
them. This can encourage more litigation, which in turn enhances
mobilization. Lawsuits also provide lawyers with an education about how
to litigate more effectively, and they provide activists a flag around which
to rally.267 Clergy sexual abuse litigation has been a central force in
mobilizing victims, lawyers, and activists.
The mobilizing effect of the Gauthe case on victims was dramatic.
Following news reports of the case, abuse victims began to come forward
in increasing numbers. They complained to their local Bishop. Based on
data from a study commissioned by the USCCB, dioceses received 328
abuse reports in the five years prior to national coverage of the Gauthe
litigation (1980-1984). That number rose to 817 in the five years
following (1985-1989).268 Victims and their families also contacted
lawyers. Jeff Anderson, a plaintiffs' attorney, reports that following news
coverage of a lawsuit that he filed in 1984 against the Archdiocese of St.
Paul and Minneapolis based on the sexual misconduct of Father Thomas
Adamson, "other survivors began to stream, literally, into my office ....
[They were] outraged by the [Church's] denial and [had] now come to
realize that they weren't alone .... And that led me to just start to file suit
pretty vigorously on behalf of them., 269 Steve Rubino, another plaintiffs'
attorney, reports that, in the years following the Gauthe case, "hundreds of
cases around the country were being quietly settled. 270
The years following the Gauthe case were also a significant period of
learning for plaintiffs' attorneys-learning fueled by litigation against the
Church. In early cases, discovery yielded little proof of any knowledge on
the part of Bishops that abuse was occurring on their watch. Bishops
denied knowingly reassigning priests with a history of abuse, and diocesan
personnel files offered little or no evidence. Jeff Anderson recounts how
he learned that Bishops kept damaging information about priests in a
"secret archive," rather than in personnel files. 271 As mandated by Canon
267 MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 279 (1994); Mather, supra note 5, at 923.
268 E-mail from Margaret Leland Smith, Criminologist, Member of the Institute for Criminal
Justice Ethics at John Jay College and Coordinator of Prisons Self Help Legal Clinic in Newark, NJ,
and Statistician for the John Jay Report (July 21, 2006) (data on file with Connecticut Law Review).269 Anderson Interview, supra note 17, at 5.
270 Clohessy Interview, supra note 17; Rubino Interview, supra note 17.
27 Anderson Interview, supra note 17, at 6.
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law, only the bishop had a key to this "secret archive., 272 "I began to
realize," recalls Anderson, "that those [secret] files contained
excruciatingly clear evidence of [the Bishops'] knowledge and their
complicity and their protection of multiple offenders .... I then began to
subpoena the files in every case. 273
Steve Rubino recounts how he learned of The Official Catholic
Directory, an annual publication that includes information about the
clerical assignments of U.S. priests.274 This allowed him to trace the
assignment history of any particular priest, which might include periods of
sick leave, assignment to treatment facilities, or periods without any
assignment. 275 The subsequent assignment of the priest to a new parish
offered clues about the practice of reassigning known offenders.276
The combination of documents from the secret file, and information
from the directory provided a "road map for depositions," explains Rubino.
"We learned exactly what to ask., 277 Anderson and Rubino collaborated
with Church insiders advocating reforms, meeting to talk informally about
cases, discuss strategy, and share information.278 Thus, in the aftermath of
the Gauthe case, plaintiffs' lawyers waged a long-term campaign to collect
more discovery information in each case they litigated-what Anderson
describes as "a base of knowledge that is cumulatively obtained.
279
Like the Gauthe case, the Porter case led many victims to come
forward for the first time. David Clohessy, National Director of the
Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP)-a victim support
and advocacy group formed in 1989-recalls that "any time the issue's in
the press, some survivors get the courage and the strength to come forward
and report to police or the prosecutors or [to seek out] civil attorneys or
support groups .... We began in 1989, but certainly.., we got a lot more
calls after the Porter case. 28 °
Following the Geoghan case, victim reports of abuse skyrocketed.
According to data from a study commissioned by the USCCB, 234
allegations were reported to dioceses in 2001. In 2002, that number
increased to 3399.28 The Geoghan case unleashed a tidal wave of
litigation affecting dioceses across the country. In 2002, the Boston
272 THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 396 c.489, 397 c.490 (James A.
Coriden et al. eds., 1985).
273 Anderson Interview, supra note 17, at 6, 8.
274 Rubino Interview, supra note 17, at 7.
275 Id.
276 id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Anderson Interview, supra note 17, at 7.
280 Clohessy Interview, supra note 17; see also SNAP National Office, http://www.snap
network.org/snap regionaloffices/nationaloffice.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007) (providing SNAP
information).
281 E-mail from Margaret Leland Smith, supra note 268.
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archdiocese settled claims with eighty-six Geoghan victims for $10
million, and a year later the archdiocese settled an additional 554 claims
for $85 million. 82 Dioceses in Portland, Spokane and Tucson filed for
bankruptcy in the face of overwhelming claims.283 Hardest hit was
California. In 2003 when the California state legislature suspended the
statute of limitations on child sexual abuse claims for a one-year period, a
flood of litigation began. Lifting the statute of limitations, combined with
the lack of any charitable damage cap like that in Massachusetts, led to the
filing of over 850 civil claims in California-more than 560 of them
against the Archdiocese of Los Angeles involving over 200 priests and
Church officials.284 In January 2005, the Diocese of Orange, California,
settled with eighty-seven victims for $100 million--exceeding the $85
million settlement in Boston in 2003.285 Settlement talks in Los Angeles
are ongoing and many claims are currently headed for trial.286
Membership organizations dedicated to the issue of clergy sexual
abuse have also grown since 2002. According to SNAP National Director,
David Clohessy, as of June 2005 his organization had 5200 members and
sixty chapters in thirty-five states.287 Another well-known organization,
the Healing Alliance-founded in 1991 and formerly known as LinkUp-
counts over 3000 members.288 Voice of the Faithful, a Church reform
organization founded in 2002 in response to the clergy abuse problem in
Boston, claims "tens of thousands of members today throughout the
289world," and 25,000 supporters. In July 2002, the group attracted 4200
attendees and 125 journalists from thirty-six states and seven countries to
its first conference in Boston.290
282 Fox Butterfield, Church in Boston to Pay $85 Million in Abuse Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Walter V. Robinson & Michael
Rezendez, Geoghan Victims Agree to $10M Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2002, at Al,
available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File.
283 See Davis, supra note 8, at 14.
284 An Explanation of the Clergy Abuse Litigation in California, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 9,
2004, available at LexisNexis Academic, News Wires; Jean Guccione & Megan Garvey, Abuse Cases
Could Go to Trial in '06, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at BI, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT
File; Drew Griffin, California Diocese Settles Clergy Sexual Abuse Cases, CNN.COM, Dec. 3, 2004,
http://www5.cnn.com/2004/LAW/l 2/03/church.abuse/.
285 Griffin, supra note 284.
286 Guccione & Garvey, supra note 284.
287 Telephone Interview with David Clohessy, National Director, SNAP, in Albany, NY (June 17,
2005) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
288 See The Healing Alliance, http://www.healingall.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2006); see also Mary
Nevans-Pederson, Groups Offer Support, Healing: Victims ofAbuse by Clergy Find Help, TELEGRAPH
HERALD, March 11, 2006, available at http://www.snap-greatplains.org/dubuque/MyHomepage
_Files/Page7.html.
289 Voice of the Faithful, The Voice of the Faithful Story, http://www.votf.org/WhoWeAre/
story.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
290 Voice of the Faithful, Highlights from the "Response of the Faithful" Convention,
http://www.votf.org/Convention/highlights.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
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2. Church Policy Agendas
There are at least three clear indicators that litigation helped place the
issue of clergy sexual abuse on the policy agenda of the Catholic Church.
The first is the attention paid to it by Bishops-both individually and as a
group. The second are public statements by Pope John Paul II and Vatican
officials. The third is widespread concern about the issue among clergy.
As we shall see, heightened attention to the issue by these three groups
coincides with the Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases and with the concern
among the general public, the Catholic laity, and elites advocating policy
reform.
a. The Bishops
The USCCB is a membership organization of U.S. Bishops
headquartered in Washington, D.C. with a 350-person staff. The purposes
of the USCCB are outlined by its corporate charter:
To unify, coordinate, encourage, promote and carry on
Catholic activities in the United States; to organize and
conduct religious, charitable and social welfare work at home
and abroad; to aid in education; to care for immigrants; and
generally to enter into and promote by education, publication
and direction the objects of its being.291
In 2001, the USCCB was created out of a merger between the United
States Catholic Conference (USCC) and the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops (NCCB), both founded in 1966.292 The NCCB was also a
membership organization of Bishops created to coordinate their activities
nationwide. The USCCB, like the NCCB before it, holds semi-annual
meetings every June and November and has various committees that meet
throughout the year. I
In response to the Gauthe case and the growing revelation of a
nationwide problem, NCCB staff began to research the problem of clergy
sexual abuse and to offer advice to Bishops facing allegations within their
dioceses. 293 Concurrently, Gauthe attorney Ray Mouton, Canon lawyer
Father Thomas Doyle, and psychiatrist Father Michael Peterson-the
director of a treatment program for priest sex abusers-wrote a report
entitled The Problem of Sexual Molestation by Roman Catholic Clergy:
291 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, About Us, http://www.usccb.org/whoweare.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2006).2WId.
293 See BERRY, supra note 1, at 96-102, 110-12; JASON BERRY & GERALD RENNER, VOWS OF
SILENCE: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN THE PAPACY OF JOHN PAUL II 45-46, 48 (2004); BURKETT &
BRUNI, supra note 22, at 164, 173; FRANCE supra note 28, at 230; INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE
BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 39-40; Chopko Interview, supra note 248; United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops, Efforts To Combat Clergy Sexual Abuse Against Minors: A Chronology,
http://www.usccb.org/comm/kit2.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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Meeting the Problem in a Comprehensive and Responsible Manner, which
they subsequently distributed to Bishops. At a June 1985 NCCB meeting
in Collegeville, Minnesota, the Bishops dedicated an entire day of
executive session to examining the psychological, legal, and moral aspects
of clergy sexual abuse within the Church. They also considered non-
binding recommendations for how individual dioceses could best respond
to the problem, and they charged the Committee on Priestly Life &
Ministry to undertake further consideration of the matter. Following the
meeting, NCCB staff conducted research on the spread of litigation,
addressing clergy sexual abuse around the country. NCCB staff also
helped dioceses develop training programs to prevent child abuse, policies
for reporting it, and protocols for assisting victims and their families.
Some individual Bishops took it upon themselves to investigate abuse in
their own dioceses, issue reports, and create new procedures for dealing
with claims.
The Porter case in 1992 put the issue of clergy sexual abuse back at the
top of the NCCB's agenda. At their June meeting, the Bishops dedicated
most of their eight-hour closed executive session to the question of
whether priests who had sexually abused children should be allowed to
return to ministry.294 At their November meeting later that year, the
Bishops formally endorsed a non-binding set of "Five Principles" to guide
Bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse: (1) prompt response to
allegations, (2) immediate suspension of accused priests and investigation
of allegations, (3) compliance with reporting requirements under civil law
and cooperation with criminal investigations, (4) victim outreach, and (5)
greater transparency in dealing with the issue.295 A year later, at their June
1993 meeting, the Bishops issued public statements of remorse, created an
ad hoc sub-committee on sexual abuse, and adopted a brief non-binding
resolution pledging an "appropriate and effective" response to the
problem.296 As in the wake of the 1985 Collegeville meeting, the issue
continued to receive attention in committees and individual dioceses.297
If clergy sexual abuse first appeared on the NCCB agenda in 1985 and
rose to the top of it in 1992 and 1993, it is fair to say that it completely
dominated the Bishops' agenda in 2002. The Geoghan case and its
aftermath concerned the Bishops throughout the year. In fact, the only
item on the agenda for the June 2002 meeting in Dallas was clergy sex
294 BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at 173-74.
295 Harry J. Flynn, Dallas and Beyond-Perspectives of a Bishop and Pastor, in SEXUAL ABUSE IN
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: TRUSTING THE CLERGY? 13, 15 (Marie M. Fortune & W. Merle Longwood
eds., 2003); see also STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 48.
296 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 230-31; see also STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 48; Flynn, supra
note 295, at 15; NCCB Establishes Committee on SexualAbuse, 23 ORIGINS 104 (1993).
297 See STEINFELS, supra note 178, at 50-52, 56-61; Flynn, supra note 295, at 15-17.
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abuse.298 The Boston Globe's investigative staff described the atmosphere
of the meeting as "the kind of circus that normally attends a presidential
convention: seven hundred reporters and producers and camera crews;
theologians and laypeople and priests and nuns; protesters representing the
full spectrum of causes lined up outside the Fairmont Hotel beside the
television tents and the small army of police.
299
After highly publicized proceedings, the Bishops adopted the Charter
for the Protection of Children & Young People, a binding policy that
proclaimed "zero tolerance" for clergy sexual abuse within the Church,
along with a set of Essential Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial Policies
Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests or Deacons
to guide implementation of the Charter.300 The Charter created lay review
boards in each diocese to assess claims and make recommendations to the
bishop, a National Review Board charged with overseeing compliance with
the policy and commissioning a comprehensive study of the problem, and
an Office of Child and Youth Protection to assist with implementation of
the policy.30 1 Subsequent revisions to the Charter and Norms demanded by
the Vatican, ongoing debate over its provisions and implementation, and
publication of the comprehensive study have maintained clergy sexual
abuse on the USCCB's agenda. Throughout 2002, individual Bishops in
their dioceses also implemented additional reforms.30 2
The prominence of clergy sexual abuse on NCCB/USCCB's meeting
agendas in 1985, 1992-1993, and 2002 coincides with the Gauthe, Porter,
and Geoghan cases. As we saw earlier, these three cases also increased
concern over clergy sexual abuse among the general public, the Catholic
laity, and elites advocating policy reform. These findings suggest-
consistent with theories of agenda access-that litigation may have
influenced the Bishops' policy agenda by providing focusing events that
expanded concern over clergy sexual abuse to larger publics, thereby
creating pressure to place the issue on the Bishops' institutional agenda.
We should be careful not to overstate the case. It would be inaccurate
to say that there was no policymaking activity among the Bishops in the
years between the Gauthe and Porter cases (1985-1991) and the Porter and
Geoghan cases (1994-2001). NCCB staff and subcommittees were busy
gathering information and assisting individual dioceses in developing new
policies during both of these periods. The momentary rise of clergy sexual
298 See FRANCE, supra note 28, at 362.
299 INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 210.
300 See Raymond O'Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 363, 408 (2004).
301 See id at 423-28.
302 See, e.g., DIOCESE OF MANCHESTER, DIOCESAN TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
POLICY, REPORT TO THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER (2003), available at http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/ManchesterTaskForceReport.pdf A Look at the
Impact of the Roman Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal on the States, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 27, 2002,
available at LexisNexis Academic, News Wires.
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abuse to the top of the NCCB/USCCB's agenda in 1992 and 2002, and the
flurry of policy initiatives that followed, might best be characterized as
what Kingdon calls policy windows. These are "occasions during which a
problem becomes pressing, creating an opportunity for advocates of
proposals to attach their solutions to it.,,'3  Focusing events, explains
Kingdon, often open a window of opportunity for policy change.3 4
Successful proposals for change do not merely appear when a policy
window opens. Rather, those actively pursuing policy change---"policy
entrepreneurs"--push steadily for consideration of their proposals and
increase their salience with the public and policy elites so that when a
policy window does open, conditions are ripe for adoption of the policy.
Kingdon calls this "softening up the system.
305
I would like to suggest that the Gauthe, Porter, and Geoghan cases
served as focusing events that opened up policy windows which policy
entrepreneurs-victims' advocates, plaintiffs' attorneys, and reformers
within the Church-used to promote policy change. Ongoing litigation in
the periods of diminished press coverage played an essential role in
softening up the system.
b. The Vatican
Clergy sexual abuse also made it onto the Vatican's policy agenda.
Responding to intense media coverage of the Porter case, the Pope made
his first public statement about the issue in 1993 while addressing a group
of visiting U.S. Bishops in Rome, saying that he shared their "sadness and
disappointment when those entrusted with the ministry fail in their
commitment, becoming a cause of public scandal," and denouncing
"sensationalism" in the news media.30 6
In 2002, at the height of press coverage about the issue, papal
spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls made statements to the press blaming
the crisis on homosexuality among priests.30 7 Prior to the Dallas meeting,
the Pope summoned the American Cardinals to Rome for two days in April
2002 and suggested that the Church was leading an effort to grapple with a
general crisis in sexual morality:
The abuse of the young is a grave symptom of a crisis
affecting not only the Church but society as a whole. It is a
deep-seated crisis of sexual morality, even of human
303 KINGDON, supra note 218, at 177.
304 id.
301 Id. at 190, 210.
306 Alan Cooperman, During His Long Reign, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A36, available at
LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
307 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 357; INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26,
at 169.
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relationships, and its prime victims are the family and the
young. In addressing the problem of abuse with clarity and
determination, the Church will help society to understand and
deal with the crisis in its midst.308
Vatican attention to the issue continued after the Dallas meeting, with
successful efforts in the summer of 2002 to revise the Dallas Charter and
Norms.3 °9 Just as we saw in examining the Bishops' agenda, the
appearance of clergy sexual abuse on the Vatican's agenda coincides with
the Porter and Geoghan cases.
c. The Priesthood
Clergy sexual abuse also found a prominent place on the agenda of
priests as a group. A 1993 Los Angeles Times poll of 2087 Catholic priests
in eighty dioceses found that 41% said they considered "pedophilia within
the priesthood" a "very serious problem," and another 31% ranked it as
"somewhat serious," while 18% called it "not too serious or not at all
serious. 3 °10 A subsequent 2002 Los Angeles Times poll of 1854 priests
found that 69% agreed, in reference to clergy sexual abuse, that "[t]he
Catholic church in America is now facing its biggest crisis in the last
century." 3" Additionally, 18% ranked it as the most important problem
facing the Church.31 2
Clergy sexual abuse has also been prominent on the agenda of the
National Federation of Priests Councils (NFPC), a national organization of
priests founded in 1968.3' 3  At national conventions and regional
convocations, former NFPC president, Father Bob Silva, often discussed
the problem. At the organization's 2003 fall convocation in Cincinnati, he
addressed "how priests are coping with the scandal. 31 4  Following the
public release of the USCCB national survey of the problem in 2004, he
issued a public statement calling it "downright scandalous" and said that it
"shows the failure of a system of silence and secrecy that allowed such
abuse to take place. ,3 15 At his address to the 2005 annual convention in
Portland, Oregon, he listed clergy sexual abuse sixth in a list of eight issues
on the "agenda for the priests of the United States in the circumstances of
308 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 420; see also INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra
note 26, at 200.
309 INV ESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 26, at 212-13.
310 Larry B. Stammer, Conservative Trend Found in Younger Priests, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
31 L.A. TIMES POLL, supra note 204, at 2.
312 Id. at 8.
313 Notre Dame Archives, PFPC National Federation of Priests' Councils: Printed Material,
http://archives.nd.edu/findaids/ead/index/FPC020.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
314 National Federation of Priests' Councils, Fall Convocation of Priests, Oct. 28, 2003,
http://www.nfpc.org/archives_10-28-03-FCOP.html [hereinafter Fall Convocation Address].
3 1 National Federation of Priests' Councils, Statement of the NFPC, Feb. 27, 2004,
http://www.nfpc.org/archivesNFPCstatement_02-27-04.html [hereinafter Statement of the NFPC].
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the Church today. 316  According to a 2004 national survey of NFPC
member diocesan councils, "[s]ex abuse has jumped up to the top of the list
as a key agenda item.,
317
3. Government Policy Agendas
Litigation also placed clergy sexual abuse on the agendas of law
enforcement and state legislatures. In the wake of civil litigation, one finds
law enforcement more willing to investigate and prosecute child sexual
abuse by clergy and to address it as a serious policy concern. Legislatures
have also taken up proposals to eliminate the clergy exclusion to
mandatory reporting laws and remove barriers to prosecution such as
statutes of limitation.
a. Law Enforcement
Tort litigation against the Church and the public concern it generated
increased efforts to investigate and prosecute clergy sexual abuse. Of
course, it would be a gross overstatement to suggest that in all cases civil
litigation was responsible for increased investigation and prosecution.
Indeed, in some cases, secrecy agreements in civil settlements proved to be
a hindrance to enforcement and prosecution. Nevertheless, there is
evidence that civil litigation placed clergy abuse litigation on the agenda of
many law enforcement officers and agencies.
Accounts of high profile cases offer anecdotal evidence that tort
litigation increased criminal investigation and prosecution of clergy sexual
abuse. Berry relates that criminal prosecution of Gauthe did not occur
until after civil suits were filed and reported in the news media.318
Plaintiffs' attorney Simon suggests in his account of the Gauthe affair that
District Attorney Nathan Stansbury was reluctant to prosecute Gauthe, and
that press coverage of the civil suits provided the pressure, or at least the
cover, necessary to proceed against the Church.3 1 9
National press coverage of the Gauthe litigation influenced law
enforcement officials beyond Lafayette, Louisiana. As Philip Jenkins
writes:
316 National Federation of Priests' Councils, Fr. Bob Silva's Address to NFPC Portland
Convention, April 12, 2005, http://www.nfpc.org/presaddress.html.
317 National Federation of Priests' Councils, Council Survey 2004, http://www.nfpc.org/archives
_survey-2004.html.
318 See BERRY, supra note 1, at 25.
319 See SIMON, supra note 16, at 137, 141. But see BERRY, supra note 1, at 20, 25, 49-50, 118-
19, 121-24 (painting a different picture, Berry credits plaintiffs' attorney Hebert with first bringing the
matter to Stansbury's attention and providing him with key witnesses, and he portrays Stansbury as
pursuing a prompt and vigorous prosecution based on his own desire to see Gauthe punished for his
crimes).
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Before 1984, there was a conspicuous lack of public
agencies with a desire or ability to intervene officially in
cases, and police and prosecutors were usually reluctant to
offend so powerful a constituent as the local Catholic
church .... The Gauthe case shaped reporting of a series of
scandals that broke between 1984 and 1986, in which
Catholic priests or religious had sexual contacts with minors,
sometimes children who were in their charge in the capacity
of pupils or altar boys. Nationwide there were at least forty
instances in those years in which Catholic priests would be
charged with multiple acts of molestation and outright rape.
Courts now showed themselves more willing to intervene in
the hitherto confidential disciplinary proceedings of the
Catholic Church. Prosecutors also became increasingly
prepared to press criminal charges in such cases, and in 1985
and 1986 notorious criminal trials ensued in some strongly
Catholic communities .... After 1985 ... criminal justice
agencies realized that traditional qualms about embarrassing
church authorities were increasingly questionable, and
restraint that once seemed politically wise would now be
legally dangerous.32°
Jenkins also documents how, after 1985, reluctance to prosecute clergy
or to challenge the Church could even become a political liability for
prosecutors facing reelection.32'
Plaintiffs' attorney Eric MacLeish's use of the press, without even
filing a formal complaint, provided essential pressure for prosecution of
James Porter by the local district attorney.322 Having been rebuffed by the
district attorney more than once, several Porter victims came to MacLeish,
who helped them attract media coverage of their story in leading media
venues such as the New York Times, Newsweek, People, Prime Time Live,
60 Minutes, Geraldo, Oprah Winfrey, Phil Donahue, and Sally Jessy
Raphael. With an entourage of press, the victims then filed a complaint
with the local police. Ten days later, the district attorney launched an
investigation that eventually culminated in the prosecution and conviction
of Porter. For Bruni and Burkett, the Porter case in 1992
marked a watershed in the public's awareness of child sexual
abuse by Catholic priests, [and] it also marked a change in
the reactions of secular authorities to cases of priests who
molest. ... America's prosecutors and judges and reporters
320 JENKINS, supra note 6, at 14, 36, 48.
321 Id. at 49.
322 This paragraph draws heavily on FRANCE, supra note 28, at 208-11, 215, and BuRKETr &
BRUNI, supra note 22, at 13-17.
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seemed to awaken on a national level .... Authorities
stopped trusting the Church to handle its own
malfeasants. '323
As proof for this contention, they offer examples of prosecutions in
Massachusetts, Missouri, and Illinois immediately following the Porter
revelations.324
In addition to individual prosecutions, public concern surrounding the
Geoghan litigation in 2002 motivated law enforcement officials to issue
official reports on clergy sexual abuse and to offer policy reforms for
dealing with the problem. In 2002, grand juries were convened in
Westchester and Suffolk counties in New York. Both grand juries issued
highly publicized official reports containing detailed findings and policy
recommendations. The Suffolk grand jury report is 181 pages long and
concludes with twenty-one recommended legislative reforms. Both
documents recommend elimination of the statute of limitations for the
sexual abuse of a minor, mandatory reporting by clergy of possible sexual
abuse, criminal liability for supervisors who allow employees with a
known record of child sexual abuse access to minors, and prohibition of
confidentiality agreements in civil settlements involving sexual abuse of a
325
minor.
Grand jury proceedings in Hillsborough, New Hampshire, that same
year resulted in an agreement between New Hampshire Attorney General
Peter Heed and the Diocese of Manchester, whereby the attorney general
agreed not to press charges in exchange for mandatory reporting by
diocesan personnel of possible sex abuse; the development and
implementation by the diocese of policies, procedures, and training to
address the problem of sex abuse; an annual audit of the diocese by the
attorney general; public disclosure of the agreement; and publication by the
attorney general of a report on the investigation.326 The Attorney General's
report runs 154 pages, and details the misconduct of eight priests and the
323 BURKETT & BRUNI, supra note 22, at 197.
324 Id. at 197-98.
325 REPORT OF THE APRIL "E" 2002 WESTCHESTER COUNTY GRAND JURY CONCERNING
COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST MINORS BY MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY
1-2 (2002), available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/
WestchesterGrandJuryReport.pdf [hereinafter WESTCHESTER GRAND JURY REPORT]; SUFFOLK
COUNTY SUP. CT. SPECIAL GRAND JURY, MAY 6, 2002 TERM ID, GRAND JURY REPORT CPL
§ 190.85(1)(C) 175-79 (2003), available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-
files/reports/SuffolkGrandJuryReport.pdf [hereinafter SUFFOLK GRAND JURY REPORT].3 2 6 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF N.H. AND THE DIOCESE OF MANCHESTER, INRE GRAND
JURY PROCEEDINGS, No. 02-S-1154, N.H. SUPER. CT., at 2-7 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/NewHampshireAgreement.pdf
[hereinafter N.H. AGREEMENT].
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diocese's role in facilitating and covering it up.327 In 2003, a Philadelphia
grand jury issued an 800-page scathing critique of archdiocesan officials,
asserting that "the Archdiocese's 'handling' of the abuse scandal was at
least as immoral as the abuse itself., 328 Grand juries were also empanelled
to investigate clergy sexual abuse in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Los Angeles,
and Phoenix.
In 2003, Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas Reilly published a
lengthy report following grand jury proceedings and additional
investigation, entitled: "The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston. 3 29 Although the report concluded that
the investigation "did not produce evidence sufficient to charge the
archdiocese or its senior managers with crimes under applicable state law,"
it did detail misconduct by archdiocesan officials, such as failing to
respond to or report clergy sexual abuse and transferring known abusers to
new parishes in the wake of allegations.330 It also recommended specific
reporting and disciplinary policies to be adopted by the archdiocese.33' In
the cover letter to the report, Reilly suggested that the purpose of
publishing the report was to confirm "that this tragedy was real," and "to
create an official public record of what occurred so that this type of
widespread abuse of children might never happen again here or
elsewhere. 332 In 2004, Maine Attorney General, G. Steven Rowe, issued a
similar report on clergy sexual abuse allegations in the Catholic Church in
Maine. 3
33
The impact of media coverage of clergy abuse litigation on official
investigations and criminal prosecution is difficult to quantify. Based on
reports from private attorneys and a review of news coverage, Doyle
suggests:
Although there are isolated instances of criminal and
civil court actions prior to 1984, the [Gauthe] case appears to
have opened a wide gate. Since that time there have been
327 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DIOCESE OF MANCHESTER (2003), available at
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/NewHampshireAGReport.pdf
[hereinafter N.H. AG REPORT].
32 REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY, IN RE COUNTY INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY, COURT OF COM.
PL., FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PA., CRIM. TRIAL Div., Misc. No. 03-00-239, at 4 (2003), available
at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/pa_philadelphia/PhillyGJreport.htm (follow "Introduction
to Grand Jury Report" hyperlink).
329 OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON, cover letter 2 (2003), available at http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/ReillyReport.pdf [hereinafter MASS. AG REPORT].
330 Id. at cover letter 2, i-ii.
"' Id. at 74-76.
332 Id. at cover letter 2-3.
333 OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY
PRIESTS AND OTHER CLERGY MEMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ME. 1-
3, 9, 12 (2004), available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/reports/
MaineAG.pdf [hereinafter ME. AG REPORT].
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several hundred criminal prosecutions of Catholic clerics
throughout the United States. Charges have varied from
child endangerment to alienation of affection and aggravated
rape. Sentences have varied from probation, to multiple life
terms. It is estimated that perhaps 250-300 Catholic clerics
have received sentences through the criminal justice
system.
334
A study commissioned by the USCCB found 252 priests convicted for
child sexual abuse.335
b. Legislatures
Since the Geoghan case in 2002, litigation and public concern have
placed the issue of clergy sexual abuse on the agendas of state legislatures
across the country. News stories posted on a SNAP webpage covering
statutory proposals concerning clergy sexual abuse mention state
legislative activity in Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington.336
The proposals would extend or eliminate statutes of limitation for child
sexual abuse, remove clergy exemptions to mandatory child abuse
reporting laws, create child endangerment provisions that would make
diocesan supervisors criminally liable for assigning known abusers to
positions where they will have access to children, and remove civil damage
caps for charitable organizations in cases of sexual abuse. 337 While some
of these proposals have fared better than others, they are powerful evidence
that clergy abuse was placed on state legislative agendas in response to the
wave of media coverage and public concern in 2002.
B. Shaping Policy Alternatives
In discussing the dynamics of agenda access and policy change, John
Kingdon makes an important distinction between obtaining agenda access
334 Thomas P. Doyle & Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549, 550-51 (2004).
"' JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIM. JUST., supra note 8, at 61.
336 This count is based on news stories posted on the SNAP website at http://www.snap
network.org/legislation/legisindex.htm (June 22, 2005) [hereinafter SNAP Web Articles] and 2005 Bill
Tracking, H.B. 2226, 79th Leg. (W. Va. 2005).
337 Jesse Belcher-Timme, Note, Unholy Acts: The Clergy Sex Scandal in Massachusetts and the
Legislative Response, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 270-72 (2004);
Memorandum from Chrissta Forslund to Professor Leslie Griffin, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes and
Clergy (July 25, 2004) (on file with Connecticut Law Review); SNAP Web Articles, supra note 336.
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for an issue and defining the policy alternatives.338 The success of a group
in placing an issue on an agenda is not a guarantee against refraining of the
issue as a different problem or adoption of policy alternatives not favored
by the group. In discussing the impact of tort litigation on policy responses
to clergy sexual abuse litigation, I have already discussed the impact of
litigation on framing the problem and placing the problem on public and
institutional agendas. I turn now to how litigation shaped policy
alternatives to address the problem.
Tort litigation and the news media coverage that it inspired have
decisively shaped the terms in which the issue has been debated and helped
define the policy alternatives proposed to address the problem. Plaintiffs'
framing, adopted by the news media, placed primary responsibility for
clergy sexual abuse on diocesan officials who knew it was happening,
failed to stop it, and, by concealing it, allowed it to proliferate. The real
scandal, according to this view, was not the occurrence of child sexual
abuse within the Church, but the complicity of Church officials. As one
victim put it: "The Church is the real sodomist."33 9 Public and official
reaction to the issue reveal the dominance of this frame in efforts to find
policy solutions to the problem of clergy sexual abuse.
1. Church Policies
The frame of institutional responsibility has dominated discussion of
clergy sexual abuse within the Church. Meetings of the USCCB, and the
NCCB before it, in 1985, 1992 and 1993, and 2002 to the present have
focused on institutional norms and procedures to be adopted by Bishops as
a matter of diocesan policy. 34°  Public admissions of institutional
responsibility, however, came only gradually. In 1992, NCCB President
and Cincinnati Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk issued a vague statement
admitting only that "[i]n the matter of priests and sexual abuse,
undoubtedly mistakes have been made in the past,, 341 and the Bishops at
their November meeting issued a similarly vague resolution expressing
their "profound concern for all those who have been victims of sexual
abuse, particularly when that abuse has been committed by a member of
the clergy., 342 Addressing the June 1993 NCCB conference, the Ad Hoc
Committee on Sexual Abuse Chair, Bishop John Kinney, suggested:
338 See KINGDON, supra note 218, at 4.
339 BURKETr & BRUN], supra note 22, at 136.
340 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of Media Relations, Efforts to Combat Clergy
Sexual Abuse Against Minors: A Chronology, http://www.usccb.org/comm/combatefforts.shtml (last
visited Dec. 11, 2006).
341 Brooks Egerton, Documents Show Bishops Transferred Known Abuser; Church Officials Say
Policies Have Since Changed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 31, 1997, at 1 A, available at LEXIS,
News Library, DALNWS File.
342 Thomas J. Reese, Women's Pastoral Fails, Am., Dec. 5, 1992, at 443, 444, available at
http://www.americamagazine.org/reese/america/nc9211 .htm.
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It is not the sexuality of it all. It is rather the dynamic of
the misuse of power, domination and the violation of trust
between pastor and parishioner, priest and child, teacher and
student, counselor and counselee. Victims, their friends and
families have felt betrayed by those they trusted and who
were given to them in authority. And then once abused and
betrayed, some in authority did not listen to their cries for
help or were perceived as not hearing them.343
From this statement, it appears that the NCCB leader on the issue first
blamed offending priests and only then "some in authority"--presumably
Bishops-chalking part of the problem up to misperceptions among
victims. Some Bishops did not even allude to their own role, publicly
attributing the problem to "the terrible offenses of the few." 3"
By 2002, the USCCB President, Bishop Wilton Gregory, signaled that
the USCCB leadership had itself-at least publicly-adopted the frame of
institutional failure and episcopal responsibility. He began his address to
the June 2002 conference by stating that
The crisis, in truth, is about a profound loss of confidence
by the faithful in our leadership as shepherds, because of our
failures in addressing the crime of sexual abuse of children
and young people by priests and Church personnel .... The
penance that is necessary here is not the obligation of the
Church at large in the United States, but the responsibility of
the bishops ourselves. Both "what we have done" and "what
we failed to do" contributed to the sexual abuse of children
and young people by clergy and Church personnel .... It is
we who need to confess; and so we do. We are the ones,
whether through ignorance or lack of vigilance, or--God
forbid-with knowledge, who allowed priest abusers to
remain in ministry and reassigned them to communities
where they continued to abuse. We are the ones who chose
not to report the criminal actions of priests to the authorities,
because the law did not require this. We are the ones who
worried more about the possibility of scandal than in bringing
about the kinds of openness that helps prevent abuse. And
we are the ones who, at times, responded to victims and their
families as adversaries and not as suffering members of the
Church. ... [I]n my own name and in the name of all the
bishops, I express the most profound apology to each of you
343 NCCB Establishes Committee on Sexual Abuse, supra note 296, at 105 (emphasis added).
344 FRANCE, supra note 28, at 231.
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who have suffered sexual abuse by a priest or other official of
the Church .... We ask your forgiveness.345
The Dallas Charter opens with a similarly bold statement of episcopal
responsibility:
The sexual abuse of children and young people by some
deacons, priests, and bishops, and the ways in which these
crimes and sins were addressed, have caused enormous pain,
anger, and confusion. As bishops, we have acknowledged our
mistakes and our roles in that suffering, and we apologize
and take responsibility again for too often failing victims and
the Catholic people in the past.346
Debate about the non-binding policies of the 1993 and 2002 Charter
and Norms has been framed in terms of the extent of and proper responses
to institutional failures. The 2002 Los Angeles Times poll of Catholic
priests found that in response to the question "what one aspect of the crisis
bothers you the most," the most popular response (21%) was "[t]he way
the bishops have responded to the crisis," ahead of due process for accused
priests (16%) and media coverage of the crisis (14%). The fourth most
popular response (9%) was "[b]ishops covering up guilt on the part of
abusive priests. 347 In a 2004 statement to the press, NFPC President Silva
said that the most disturbing aspect of the clergy abuse problem in the
Church was "the negligence and failure of leadership to address the sin and
crime within the system. 3 48 Surveys of laity, like those of the general
public, reflect that a majority of Catholics blamed the Church as an
institution and its leadership. They disapproved of the way the Church as
an institution dealt with clergy sexual abuse, believed that it had done a
bad job in dealing with the problem or that it should have done more to
combat the problem, and called for the resignation of Bishops who failed
to report abuse.349
2. Government Policies
The frame of institutional responsibility has figured prominently in
policy reforms considered by law enforcement, and legislators have framed
their policy proposals as responses to institutional failure. While the grand
jury and state attorney general reports detail individual incidents of abuse,
Attorney General Reilly's conclusion is typical of the reports-"the
widespread abuse of children was due to an institutional acceptance of
345 SHAKEN BY SCANDALS, supra note 213, at 221-23 (emphasis added).
3 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND
YOUNG PEOPLE, pmbl. (2002), available at http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/charter.shtml (emphasis added).
347 L.A. TIMES POLL, supra note 204, at 27.
3 Statement of the NFPC, supra note 315.
349 See poll data in text accompanying supra notes 226-29.
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abuse and a massive and pervasive failure of leadership."3 ° Legislative
proposals such as mandatory reporting requirements, criminal penalties for
child endangerment, and removing damage caps are all directly related to
the liability of Church officials and dioceses as institutional actors.
Eliminating the statute of limitations for civil suits is also aimed at
allowing courts to impose liability on these institutional actors. Whether
successful or not, government policy proposals focused lobbying efforts
and debate on the institutional dimensions of the problem. That is, policy
discussion was framed in terms of addressing institutional failure and
episcopal responsibility.
IV. A CHALLENGE To TORT-REFORM ADVOCATES AND
LITIGATION SKEPTICS
In challenging tort-reform advocates who denounce the litigation
process as inefficient and litigation skeptics who suggest that litigation is
an ineffective means of achieving social change, it is important first to
clarify the limits of my claims in this Article. My analysis of clergy sex
abuse litigation rests on two causal claims: (1) tort litigation led the news
media to report clergy sexual abuse and to frame it as an issue of
institutional failure, and (2) litigation and the news media coverage it
generated placed clergy sexual abuse on public and institutional policy
agendas and shaped policy responses to it.
My evidence for the first causal connection between clergy sexual
abuse litigation and media coverage is (a) the correlation between the
timing and content of particular lawsuits (Gauthe, 1984; Porter, 1992;
Geoghan, 2002) and news coverage and (b) journalists' statements about
their reliance on litigation as a source for their stories. This empirical
evidence is supported by a theoretical model that suggests a correlation
between certain features of tort litigation-such as the framing of claims in
terms of dramatic narrative, the public availability of litigation documents,
and the protracted and dramatic nature of litigation-and the primary
forces that shape the process of news production-in particular, sensitivity
350 MASS. AG REPORT, supra note 329, at 73; see also ME. AG REPORT, supra note 333, at 10-11
(detailing the inadequacy of the diocese response to allegations of clergy sexual abuse); N.H.
AGREEMENT, supra note 326, at 1 (focusing on the question of whether "the Diocese itself or any of its
agents committed any crimes in connection with the handling of sexual abuse incidents by clergy");
N.H. AG REPORT, supra note 327, at 154 (concluding that the "Diocese breached a duty of care" to
victims and their families); SUFFOLK GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 325, at 174 (finding "the
actions of Diocesan officials who were responsible for making and implementing policy
reprehensible"); WESTCHESTER GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 325, at 2 (referring to the need to
address "a systematic failure by the religious institution that these clergy members serve to respond
appropriately when receiving a report of this activity").
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to audience demand, a desire to project credibility, and the construction of
news themes.
I do not mean to imply that litigation was the only cause of news
coverage or the only influence on news frames, just that it was a dominant
one. Moreover, it is important to note that the causal influence between
the litigation and the news coverage was reciprocal. Not only did the
litigation influence news coverage, news coverage influenced the litigation.
By promoting the plaintiffs' frames, news coverage encouraged other
victims to file suit and made plaintiffs' frames more culturally resonant
among judges and potential jurors in future cases. Indeed, news coverage
of ritual child sex abuse and corporate scandals, prior to clergy sex abuse
litigation, accounts for much of the persuasive power of the plaintiffs'
frames in the first place.
My evidence for the second causal connection between litigation and
news coverage on the one hand and the presence of clergy sex abuse on
public and institutional agendas and the policy responses to it on the other
hand is (a) poll data; (b) data concerning the high volume and prominent
venues of media coverage; (c) grass roots activism among victims,
lawyers, and Catholic reformers; and (d) the promulgation of policies
addressing the institutional dimensions of the issue by Church policy
makers, law enforcement officials, and legislatures. As I have shown,
there is a correlation between significant litigation events and increases in
attention to the issue among the general public, the Catholic laity, policy
elites, and policymakers as measured by these empirical indicators. This
correlation is consistent with theoretical models drawn from media and
policy scholarship suggesting that focusing events, such as high-stakes
litigation, influence public agendas and that public agendas influence
institutional agendas and policy debate.
My evidence for this second causal claim has important limitations.
Poll data is never entirely reliable and press coverage is merely a proxy for
public awareness. Together, however, they do offer some evidence of the
presence and prominence of the issue on public agendas.
In addition, the correlation between focusing events and the presence
of an issue on policy agendas is not definitive proof of a causal
relationship. Rarely, however, does social theory offer definitive proof of
causal connections. Moreover, there were certainly other causal influences
on these agendas and policy alternatives, but since so much of what
members of the public and policymakers know about issues comes from
the media-which was in this case based largely on information and
frames generated by litigation-it is likely that litigation played a
significant role.
In short, I have argued that the tort litigation process has had a
significant and beneficial impact on policymaking in the case of clergy
sexual abuse. Clergy sexual abuse litigation made it possible for child
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sexual abuse victims to hold one of the largest, richest, and most powerful
institutions in America publicly accountable. It put the Church on trial, not
only in the civil courts but also in the courts of public and Catholic lay
opinion. It led the USCCB to issue public apologies to the victims, to the
Church, and to the public at large. Moreover, the litigation forced reluctant
Church and government officials to adopt sensible policies to address a
widespread social problem. The Charter for the Protection of Children &
Young People, the Essential Norms, the diocesan and national review
boards, and the Office of Child and Youth Protection are all carefully
considered concrete measures that Church officials have taken to address
the problem. Investigations and reports by grand juries and state attorneys
general, criminal prosecutions, mandatory reporting requirements for
clergy, new penalties for child endangerment, the removal of damage caps,
and extensions or elimination of statutes of limitation are similarly
concrete examples of government policy responses prompted by the
litigation.
While I view the framing and agenda-setting effects of clergy sexual
abuse litigation as generally favorable, I recognize that these effects may
not always promote such a positive outcome. Tort reform advocates argue
that tort litigation is largely frivolous and wasteful and that it produces
perverse regulatory outcomes. They allege that rampant litigation and
inflated jury awards constitute a major drain on society's resources. They
assert that widespread fear of liability created by the tort system leads to
the withdrawal of essential products and services and stifles safety
innovation.3 5' Defenders of the current tort regime have responded by
pointing to the benefits of tort litigation for regulatory policymaking in
terms of uncovering concealed information of corporate wrongdoing,
framing, and agenda setting. The debate to date has been largely anecdotal
with tort reform advocates citing horror stories and defenders offering
counterexamples. Unfortunately, this Article does not advance the debate
beyond the battle of examples. It does, however, provide the clearest
example to date of the benefits of tort litigation for policymaking. While I
have not argued that these benefits outweigh the costs of the litigation, I
have shown that they are significant. Of course, one should be careful
about making general claims concerning the policymaking benefits of tort
litigation solely on the basis of clergy sexual abuse litigation. Assessing
351 See, e.g., CRIER, supra note 10; HOWARD, supra note 10, at 57-62; HUBER, supra note 10, at
11-14; OLSON, supra note 10, at 98, 295-97. These critics also claim that private lawsuits are meant to
resolve private disputes, not to make public policy. In the American constitutional scheme, they assert
policymaking is a task for elected legislatures not common law courts. I have addressed these claims in
Timothy D. Lytton, Using Litigation to Make Public Health Policy: Theoretical and Empirical
Challenges in Assessing Product Liability, Tobacco, and Gun Litigation, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 556,
558-59 (2004).
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the contribution of litigation to policymaking in other contexts requires
case-by-case analysis. At the very least, however, the lessons of clergy
sexual abuse litigation should cause tort reform advocates to take another,
more careful look at the benefits of tort litigation for policymaking.
The case of clergy sexual abuse presents a challenge not only to tort
reformers who argue that tort litigation has had substantial negative effects,
but also to skeptics who argue that it is ineffective as a means of achieving
social change.352  Adherents to what Gerald Rosenberg terms the
"Constrained Court" view suggest that among the reasons litigation is
ineffective at producing social change is that "framing issues in legally
sound ways robs them of 'political and purposive appeal.' ' 353 Rosenberg
himself suggests that "courts are in a weak position to produce change
[since] ... [o]nly a minority of Americans know what the courts have done
on important issues."354  Moreover, quoting another scholar, he adds,
"litigation, by its complexity and technical nature and by its lack of
dramatic moments, furnishes an ineffective peg around which to build a
mass movement." "Rally round the flag is one thing," Rosenberg
concludes, "but rally round the brief (or opinion) is quite another! 355
Rosenberg's contention that "U.S. courts can almost never be effective
producers of significant social reform' 356 is built on careful empirical and
historical analysis of U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding racial
segregation, abortion, environmental protection, electoral reapportionment,
and criminal procedure reforms. When we shift our attention to the work
of plaintiffs' lawyers in litigation against the Catholic Church, we see a
very different picture. As we have seen, framing claims in "legally sound
ways" enhances their appeal. Good litigation strategy demands that
plaintiffs' claims be framed in terms of compelling narrative drama. For
this very reason, they are newsworthy and news coverage generates
widespread public awareness of them. Even if Rosenberg is right that the
public is largely unaware of what courts do in these cases, they are very
aware-as the case of clergy sex abuse litigation shows-of the claims
made and the frames generated by the litigants. Clergy sexual abuse
litigation was neither complex nor technical, and it provided a highly
effective "peg" on which to base news stories and around which to
organize and energize groups such as Voices of the Faithful, SNAP, and
The Linkup. Neither the public nor policy makers rallied around briefs or
opinions in clergy abuse litigation. They did, however, rally around the
352 My use of clergy sexual abuse litigation as a counterexample to litigation skeptics builds on
over a decade of scholarship critiquing skepticism about the efficacy of litigation as a reform strategy.
See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 43; David Schultz, Courts and Law in American Society, in
LEVERAGING THE LAW, supra note 225, at 7-8; Mather, supra note 5, at 899-900, 902.
353 ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 12.
314 Id. at 338.
355 Id.
356 Id.
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frames launched by the litigation. While I do not wish here to challenge
Rosenberg's sweeping claim that "U.S. courts can almost never be
effective producers of significant social reform," I do wish to suggest that
the efforts of litigants in clergy sexual abuse litigation were effective in
producing major policy changes within the Catholic Church and among
law enforcement officers, and smaller but still significant policy changes
within state legislatures across the country. The extent to which this is also
true of litigation against tobacco companies, gun makers, and
pharmaceutical manufacturers varies. I would suggest-and Rosenberg's
work provides an excellent model-that we begin examination of these
examples based on empirical facts rather than generalized claims. 57
Rosenberg criticizes defenders of the "Dynamic Court" view-that
court decisions do effect significant social change-for their failure to spell
out the precise mechanisms and causal connections by which this
purported change occurs. In developing an account of the agenda-setting
and framing effects of the tort litigation process, I have attempted to do just
that by explaining why tort litigation is an influential source of news
coverage and how the news coverage it generates shapes public discourse
and policymaking.
V. CONCLUSION: VIEWING TORT LITIGATION AS A POLICY VENUE
Tort litigation has traditionally been viewed as a means of dispute
resolution and risk regulation. My analysis of clergy sexual abuse
litigation suggests that we should view it also as a policy venue-an
institutional setting in which policymaking occurs. Clergy sexual abuse
litigation illustrates how this venue can be used to promote policy change
by framing issues, achieving agenda access, and shaping policy
alternatives.
Viewing tort litigation as a policy venue is, of course, entirely
compatible with viewing it as a means of dispute resolution and risk
regulation. There is no reason why litigation cannot serve all three of these
functions. The policy-venue perspective adds significantly to our
understanding of the tort system. For one thing, it enhances our
appreciation of the value of the litigation process. Traditional views focus
on litigation outcomes and have generated justifiable criticisms of the
litigation process as an often inefficient means of dispute resolution and
risk regulation.359 There are, to be sure, quicker, less expensive, and more
direct ways to settle disputes and regulate risk than litigation. Viewing tort
311 Id. at 342.
3" FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 32 (1993).
359 See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 10, at 15, 188-89; OLSON, supra note 10, at 98, 120, 295-97.
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litigation as a policy venue, by contrast, draws our attention to the
litigation process and allows us to appreciate its value in enhancing
policymaking.
Viewing tort litigation as a policy venue also allows us to attain a
clearer understanding of the relationship between the tort system and other
regulatory institutions. The traditional risk regulation perspective tends to
view tort litigation as an alternative to other forms of regulation. Tort
litigation, on this account, competes with self-regulation, legislative
regulation, or agency regulation. According to the traditional risk-
regulation view, regulation by tort law only makes sense where these other
forms of regulation do not exist or where they fail to operate effectively.
360
When viewed as a policy venue, however, tort litigation complements these
other forms of regulation. Uncovering information, framing issues,
attracting attention to them, shaping policy alternatives, and exerting
pressure on policymakers are all ways in which tort litigation enhances the
performance of other regulatory institutions.
As I suggested in the introduction, this view of tort litigation is not
new. Scholars have been developing a better understanding of how tort
litigation enhances policymaking in case studies of products liability,
medical malpractice, tobacco litigation, and lawsuits against the gun
industry. 361  What this case study of clergy sexual abuse adds is an
especially compelling example. Tort litigation has transformed the
Catholic Church's institutional failure to protect children from child sexual
abuse into an opportunity to address the problem in meaningful ways, not
only within the Church, but in society at large.
360 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 150 (1994) (discussing the conditions under which court adjudication
should be "substituted" for agency or market regulation); PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW 350,
360-61, 363 (2000) (analyzing common law solutions to mass torts as a result of legislative inaction);
W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 20 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002)
(examining the perception that regulation by means of tort litigation is necessary where agency
regulators fail to address potential harms to society).
361 See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 6, 14, 19-21 (2005); Jacobson &
Warner, supra note 5, at 770-72; Mather, supra note 5, at 932-36; S. Teret & M. Jacobs, Prevention
and Torts: the Role of Litigation in Injury Control, 17 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 17-22 (1985);
Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products through Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1:
NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES (TABLE 1)
For all data sets, news outlets searched in the LexisNexis electronic
database were the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times,
Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Time, Newsweek, The
Nation, Forbes, U.S. News & World Report, and People. News outlets
searched in the Westlaw electronic database were the Boston Globe, Miami
Herald, Philadelphia Inquirer, San Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, St.
Louis Post Dispatch, San Jose Mercury News, Wall St. Journal abstracts,
Cosmopolitan, and Esquire. The search terms on LexisNexis were "date is
[YEAR] and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!) and not substance or
alcohol or drug or military or "human rights" or spouse or husband or army
or guerillas or labor". The search terms for Westlaw were "da([YEAR]) &
(priest clergy w/15 abus! moles!) % substance alcohol drug military
"human rights" spouse husband army guerillas labor".
Search results were reviewed in accordance with the following
guidelines. Articles that are the same or nearly the same, and appear on the
same day in separate editions of the same newspaper, were counted once.
Nearly the same was defined as most of the words in the article being
identical. Many times a later edition contained an abbreviated version of
an article printed in the morning edition. It was very clear when an article
had been shortened or slightly modified and included in a later edition.
Tangentially related articles were included in the count. For example,
articles about non-Catholic clergy sexual abuse, financial or ethical issues
related to clergy sexual abuse, international cases, etc. were all counted.
Articles that merely mentioned or alluded to the clergy abuse scandal were
not counted. This was common in the Boston Globe, for example.
Completely off-topic articles often included allusions to clergy sex abuse.
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APPENDIX 2:
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (TABLE 2)
Search terms in the LexisNexis search were "date is [YEAR] and
section (letter) or headline (letter edit!) or (section (editorial) and body (to
the editor)) or terms (letters) and (priest or clergy w/15 abus! or moles!)
and not substance or alcohol or drug or military or "human rights" or
spouse or husband or army or guerillas or labor." Search terms in the
Westlaw search were "oi(letter editor) & da([YEAR]) & (priest clergy
w/15 abus! moles!) % substance alcohol drug military "human rights"
spouse husband army guerillas labor." Search results were reviewed and
duplicates and off-topic letters were not counted.
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APPENDIX 3:
ARTICLES IN CATHOLIC PERIODICALS (TABLE 3)
This search was conducted in the Catholic Periodical and Literature
Index database using the following search terms: " sex* misconduct",
"sex* abus*", "sex* crim*", "child* abus*", "child* molest*", and
"pedophile*". Search results were reviewed and articles were included if
(1) the title of article indicated that subject matter was sexual abuse of
minors by clergy or other church personnel (e.g. nuns, brothers. . .); (2) the
article was listed under relevant subject indexing such as "child sexual
abuse by clergy," "child sexual abuse by religious," "victims of sex
crimes," and " sexual misconduct by clergy"; (3) the title of the article
referred to a nationwide (or worldwide) sex abuse scandal; (4) a review of
the text of the article revealed relevance to clergy sexual abuse; (5) subject
indexing or the title referred to names of individuals or events strongly
connected with clergy sexual abuse; and (6) the title of the article used
phrasing frequently used in connection with clergy sexual abuse.
Discretion was used where subject indexing or the title of article was
ambiguous. Articles were considered duplicates, and therefore not
counted, if they had the same title, author, and subject.
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APPENDIX 4:
NEWSPAPER & MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR,
1984-2004 (CHART 1)
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APPENDIX 5:
ARTICLES IN SELECTED CATHOLIC PERIODICALS, 1984-2004 (CHART 2)
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